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101 
POST-SALE RESTRAINTS AND 
COMPETITIVE HARM:THE FIRST SALE 
DOCTRINE IN PERSPECTIVE 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP* 
INTRODUCTION: SOURCES OF LEGAL POLICY TOWARD 
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
This Article examines one particular question at the intersection of 
competition policy and intellectual property (IP) doctrine: are there 
sufficient reasons within either IP policy or competition law for treating 
post-sale restraints on patented or copyrighted goods differently from 
those on other goods? This Article also considers whether we should 
treat restraints contained in license agreements that do not involve a 
technical sale differently from those contained in other types of 
contracts.1 
The term “post-sale restraint” refers generically to any restriction 
imposed by a seller on how a purchased good can be used or resold after 
the initial sale. In the context of the term “post-sale restraint,” “sale” 
includes leases, licenses, or other transfers of interest short of a technical 
sale. The differences among these various types of transfers can be 
decisive in legal policy. For example, IP law’s “first sale” doctrine 
applies only to true sales, as does the antitrust law of resale price 
maintenance. By contrast, “tying” law applies to sales, leases, and 
licenses without significant differentiation. Despite these legal 
distinctions, differences in the type of transfer are typically unimportant 
for understanding the fundamental economics of post-sale restraints, 
although they can be in some instances, such as where product durability 
is a problem for the monopolist.2 In 2008 the Supreme Court decided an 
important post-sale restraint case involving patents and a form of quasi-
exclusive dealing.3 At this writing, an equally divided Supreme Court 
has affirmed another first sale decision involving copyrights and resale 
price maintenance.4 
 
 * Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa School of Law. 
Thanks to Christina Bohannan for commenting on a draft. 
1. On the use of such restraints in copyright licenses, see Christina Bohannan, 
Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 MD. L. REV. 616 (2008). 
2. See infra notes 182–89 and accompanying text. 
3. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
4. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1540527
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In antitrust, the relevant law is that of vertical restraints, sometimes 
called “restricted distribution” or “vertical restrictions.”5 Vertical 
restraints are typically classified as “intrabrand” or “interbrand.” An 
intrabrand restraint limits the way a seller’s own product can be 
distributed or used. The classic example is resale price maintenance 
(RPM), in which the seller of a product stipulates its resale price.6 There 
are also intrabrand nonprice restraints, which might, for example, limit 
the locations in which downstream parties can resell the product, 
segregate commercial from noncommercial users,7 or specify in detail 
the conditions under which a product may be resold. Most field of use 
restrictions in patent law are intrabrand restraints.8 By contrast, an 
interbrand restraint limits either the purchaser’s ability to use the product 
with things produced by other suppliers, or a reseller’s ability to sell the 
goods of other sellers. The most common interbrand restraints are tying 
and exclusive dealing. A tying arrangement requires that the purchaser 
of a “tying” product (say, a printer) use it exclusively with that seller’s 
own “tied” product (ink).9 Exclusive dealing forbids a reseller handling 
 
that copyright’s statutory first sale doctrine did not apply to good that was manufactured 
outside United States but that bore design registered in United States Copyright Office; 
infringement defendant allegedly sold watch at lower price than that which plaintiff had 
stipulated in license), aff’d by an equally divided court, 131 S. Ct. 565, No. 08-1423, 
2010 WL 5058406 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2010) (Kagan, J., not participating). 
5. On vertical restraints under the antitrust laws, see PHILLIP E. AREEDA, EINER 
ELHAUGE & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 17 (2d ed. 2004) (tying); 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 16 (3d ed. 2010) 
(intrabrand restraints); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 18 (2d ed. 2005) 
(exclusive dealing). 
6. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911) 
(resale price maintenance per se unlawful under antitrust laws), overruled by Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (applying rule of 
reason). 
7. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449–50 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(software licensing agreement distinguishing commercial and noncommercial users). 
8. See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456–59 (1940) 
(resale price maintenance); Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 126 
(1938) (limitation to noncommercial uses). Field of use restrictions can also facilitate 
horizontal market division. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 
386, 400 (1945). 
9. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006) 
(refusing to condemn printer-ink tie after upsetting judicially created presumption that 
patent in tying product conferred market power); Henry v. A.B. Dick & Co., 224 U.S. 1, 
35–36 (1912) (refusing to apply first sale rule to post-sale tying condition), overruled by 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); see also Erik 
Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1443284. 
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the seller’s product from also dealing in the competing product of any 
rival. For example, a Ford dealership might be forbidden by its franchise 
contract to sell new cars made by rival manufacturers.10 
Throughout their legal history, vertical restraints have been 
controversial, and their effects on competition and welfare have proven 
notoriously difficult to assess. A purely vertical restraint does not 
eliminate competition between rivals or reduce the number of firms in 
any market. Nor does it make any firm larger.11 As a result, the twin 
concerns of competition policy, collusion and dominant firm exclusion, 
are often hard to identify. In some cases vertical restraints may channel 
or restrict future development in ways that restrain innovation.12 On the 
other side, long-term vertical contracting typically reduces firms’ costs, 
and IP restraints are essential devices for enabling firms to share risk or 
to enhance the sharing of technology. More generally, vertical 
restrictions are a very important compromise between unrestricted 
market transactions and vertical integration through ownership. They 
permit business entities to have some of the advantages of the market-
displacing mechanisms of the business firm but without all of the costs 
that outright ownership entails.13 
But the use of contracts rather than ownership can also threaten 
competition in ways that ownership integration typically does not. For 
example, many of the rationales for condemning intrabrand restraints are 
based, not on the market power of upstream sellers or IP right holders, 
but rather on concern about powerful dealers or cartels of dealers that 
may force suppliers to impose anticompetitive restrictions on these 
 
10. See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 636–38 
(2008) (refusing to enforce post-sale restraint forbidding purchasers from combining 
goods with parts not made by Intel); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 
191–96 (3d Cir. 2005) (condemning arrangement under which monopoly manufacturer 
of dental materials forbade dealers from selling rivals’ goods). The classic antitrust 
decision is Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949) 
(condemning oil refiner’s restraint forbidding gasoline stations from selling other brands 
of gasoline). 
11. However, to the extent a restraint reduces a firm’s costs or excludes rivals, 
increased size or market share may result. 
12. E.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(licensee of software not permitted to develop competing software; found to be unlawful 
copyright misuse); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (condemning under antitrust laws many restraints that Microsoft imposed on 
computer manufacturers and software producers to limit the development of rival 
internet browser Netscape), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001). 
13. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, 280–81 
(1996); Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics in 
Antitrust Analysis, ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 2–3), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592476. 
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dealers’ rivals.14 A vertically integrated firm has no incentive to make its 
distribution system less efficient internally. But independent dealers can 
profit by limiting the competition between themselves and rival 
dealers.15 Indeed, the Dr. Miles decision,16 which first brought resale 
price maintenance under a per se rule, involved a cartel of retail 
druggists that forced suppliers to impose price restraints on the cartel’s 
price-cutting rivals.17 
Vertical restraints often involve IP rights because most of these 
restraints are specific to particular brands and technologies. Someone 
selling a commodity such as potatoes typically has little to gain by 
providing that they can be used only a certain way or resold only under 
certain terms, unless of course the potatoes themselves are patented.18 
But that is often not true of manufactured goods, particularly if the 
goods create an “aftermarket.” For example, purchase of a printer, 
computer, or automobile may create ongoing demand for ink, software, 
unique replacement parts, or maintenance. Further, dealers must make 
long-run commitments to a particular seller’s good because effective 
selling requires training in the characteristics and maintenance of 
specific brands. Most vertical restraints in modern distribution systems 
arise in markets where trademarks, copyrights, and patents are important 
components. 
The modern law of distribution restraints originated in nineteenth-
century IP doctrine, long before there were any antitrust laws. The first 
significant body of distribution restraints law in the United States was 
the judge-made “first sale” doctrine, often referred to as patent 
 
14. See 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1604 (3d 
ed. 2010). 
15. Id. 
16. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled 
by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
17. Id. at 394, overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877 (2007). On the druggists’ cartel, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND 
AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 331–48 (1991). 
18. See Monsanto Co. vs. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 976–77 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(upholding post-sale restraint forbidding farmers from developing their own seed from 
plants produced from patented seeds, without finding antitrust violation or misuse and 
without discussing first sale doctrine); see also Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 
1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding the first sale doctrine did not apply for two reasons: 
first, the sale was conditional under Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 
701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), a case that was subsequently overruled in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. 
LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), and second, the restriction on reuse did not operate 
on the original seed that Monsanto sold to farmers, which was physically incapable of 
reuse; rather it applied to second generation seed produced from that seed for which 
there had never been an earlier sale). 
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“exhaustion,” which limited a patentee’s ability to place restrictions on a 
patented good after it had been sold. Where the first sale bar did not 
apply, a breach of these restrictions could be enforced by a patent 
infringement action as well as a breach of contract suit. The second body 
of legal rules originated with the Sherman Antitrust Act, whose first 
section condemns contracts that restrain trade, without any exceptional 
treatment for IP license restrictions.19 Later on, the Clayton Act 
expressly condemned tying and exclusive dealing in both patented and 
unpatented goods.20 The third body of law concerns IP “misuse,” another 
judge made doctrine that renders unenforceable an IP right held by a 
patentee or copyright holder who violates IP policy by limiting sales or 
use until the improper limitation is purged.21 
These three doctrines—first sale, antitrust, and misuse—have 
distinct histories, different technical requirements, and can be invoked in 
different situations. At the same time, however, the amount of policy 
overlap is significant. For example, the famous Motion Picture Patents 
case of 1917 denied enforcement to a classic tying arrangement.22 The 
patentee forbade anyone using its projector from using films made by 
rivals. The main body of the Supreme Court’s discussion concerned the 
first sale doctrine.23 But the Court also cited the Clayton Act as 
supporting its decision.24 Today the decision is also widely regarded as a 
“misuse” case.25 
The Supreme Court missed an opportunity to make the law of post-
sale restraints more coherent in its recent Quanta Computer decision, 
where it reverted to a strict application of the first sale rule not clearly 
related to any policy of furthering competition or innovation.26 Until 
Quanta, the case law over the last two generations had consistently 
 
19. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (current version at 15 
U.S.C. § 1 (2006)). 
20. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 
U.S.C. § 14 (2006)). 
21. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942) (misuse 
renders patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged). On the scope of misuse doctrine 
under IP policy, see Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1474407. 
22. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
23. See infra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. 
24. See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 517–18 (citing § 13 of Clayton Act in 
support of its conclusion under first sale doctrine). 
25. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 331 (rev. 4th ed. 2007) 
(using Motion Picture Patents as example of misuse). 
26. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 636–38 (2008). 
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pursued two themes: a benign attitude toward vertical restraints and a 
belief that IP rights are not inherently monopolistic. The Quanta 
decision is a reversion to an older form of patent “exceptionalism” that 
viewed post-sale restraints on patented articles as inherently suspicious. 
The Quanta case poses three questions. First, what kinds of post-
sale restraints are justifiable? Second, when should they be enforced by 
contract law, and when by infringement actions? And third, when does 
the presence of an IP right make a difference? 
On the first question, good reasons exist for limiting certain vertical 
restrictions: (a) they might injure competition by reducing output or 
raising price; (b) they might restrain innovation; and (c) they might serve 
to deny public access to public domain technology or information.27 But 
these reasons do not exist in every case, or even in a majority of them. 
As a result, harmful effects must be proven. 
On the second and third questions, breach of contract actions and 
infringement actions have different advantages and pose different 
problems. Contracts are the least problematic because they can generally 
be enforced only against people who are in privity. By contrast, 
infringement actions can run against all who infringe an IP right, and 
even those who knowingly contribute to the infringements of others. 
This increases the risk that such actions will be imposed on unsuspecting 
violators, although that problem can be addressed with a notice 
restriction.28 For these very reasons, however, infringement actions are 
also a more efficient mechanism for enforcing legitimate, welfare-
enhancing restraints. For example, imagine a regime of real property 
rights in which servitudes such as easements or building restrictions had 
to be contracted and re-contracted every time a piece of property was 
resold. There are good reasons for preferring infringement actions over 
contracts to enforce post-sale restraints in some situations but not others. 
The Quanta decision did not discuss the issue. 
The existence of three doctrinal avenues for assessing the effects of 
vertical restraints involving IP rights has served to make the legal policy 
incoherent over most of its history. Often condemnation or approval 
rests on a contract detail that has no obvious relation to either innovation 
policy or competition policy. For example, under the first sale doctrine, 
all restraints become unenforceable as a matter of IP infringement 
actions, whether or not they are anticompetitive or serve to restrain 
innovation. At the other extreme, the antitrust laws were historically 
hostile to vertical restraints, but today they rarely condemn vertical 
restraints even if they serve to limit innovation substantially. The 
 
27. Cf. Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 4). 
28. See infra notes 118–37 and accompanying text. 
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competitive rationale for the “misuse” doctrine has never been 
articulated properly in the courts, except for attempts to identify it with 
antitrust policy or to identify the harm as an improper “extension” of an 
IP right.29 
The history of legal policy concerning post-sale IP restraints sheds 
some light on why the doctrine is both so complicated and so wide of the 
mark. The principal harms that can result from post-sale conditions are 
restraints on competition and restraints on innovation. Restraints on 
competition occur when a practice reduces output, increases prices, or 
unreasonably excludes firms from a market. Restraints on innovation 
occur when a practice acts to hinder rather than to promote innovation, 
typically by imposing limitations on the innovations of others.30 Under 
the system that we have developed, antitrust law and misuse law are 
concerned almost exclusively with restraints on competition, and 
occasionally with restraints on innovation. Under Quanta, the first sale 
doctrine is not concerned with either one. Rather, when it applies, it 
blocks enforcement of post-sale restrictions as a matter of IP policy 
without regard to competitive impact or effect on innovation. 
While these three doctrines—first sale, antitrust, and misuse—
originated at different times and addressed different issues, they largely 
merged during the first half of the twentieth century. The first sale 
doctrine grew out of the common law’s strong policy against restraints 
on alienation, which had little to do with the protection of competition, 
except in the sense that it prevented wealthy landowners from tying up 
land in their families indefinitely. Harvard Law School Professor John 
Chipman Gray’s influential 1890s treatise Restraints on the Alienation of 
Property regarded the common law rules prohibiting restraints on 
alienation as virtually sacred and a fixed part of nature.31 These concerns 
dominated the development of patent law’s first sale doctrine, but they later 
merged with very little friction into the antitrust law of vertical restraints. 
When the Supreme Court first applied the antitrust laws to condemn resale 
price limitations on goods that dealers had purchased, it relied on both 
Gray’s treatise and the English common law limiting restraints on 
alienation to hold that a supplier could not impose a post-sale restraint on 
resale prices.32 
 
29. See Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 17). 
30. See id. (manuscript at 32–34); Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247 (2007). 
31. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY iii–viii 
(2d ed. 1895). 
32. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404–05 (1911), 
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
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The treatment offered here illustrates some of the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of legislation vs. judge-made rules as law 
reform devices in rapidly changing technological environments. One 
comparative advantage of judge-made rules is their relative freedom 
from interest-group capture—something that has plagued the IP laws 
since their inception.33 However, one significant disadvantage that 
judges face is that they decide disputes one at a time and often in a 
single doctrinal context. This severely limits their opportunity to 
articulate a coherent policy about multi-faceted issues such as 
competition policy and the encouragement of innovation. A well-
designed system of IP laws designed to encourage innovation while not 
limiting competition unnecessarily would almost certainly not require 
three different doctrines that are often overlapping, sometimes 
inconsistent, and more often than not provide no value added 
whatsoever. 
I. 
EARLY DISTRIBUTION RESTRAINTS AND FIRST SALE RULE 
In the mid-nineteenth century, manufacturing firms began integrating 
vertically into distribution and sale through individually franchised dealers 
rather than manufacturer-owned outlets. For example, the McCormick 
Harvesting Co. used a set of regional patent and trademark licenses to 
create ongoing franchise-like relationships with local 
manufacturers/dealers, who could produce their machines locally and sell 
them to farmers, thus making national shipment of this bulky equipment 
unnecessary.34 The arrangement also permitted McCormick to share the 
risk and cost of developing a nationwide distribution system. Such a 
licensee might agree to be the exclusive resale agent for McCormick’s 
reapers in a certain territory, or it might agree that it would not sell any 
 
33. On copyright, see Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567 (2006); on patents, particularly during the formative era, see 
Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice and Interest Groups in the 
Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1870 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262970. 
34. See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 490 (1853) (describing 
the arrangement). McCormick later changed to a more centralized distribution system 
with wholly owned outlets. On the company’s history, see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., 
THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 305–07, 
402–08 (1977); THOMAS S. DICKE, FRANCHISING IN AMERICA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 
BUSINESS METHOD, 1840–1980, at 18–19 (1992). On the place of these practices in the 
history of United States policy toward vertical integration, see generally Herbert J. 
Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880-1960, 95 IOWA 
L. REV. 863. 
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reapers other than McCormick’s. Singer Corp. did something similar with 
its sewing machines, except that the machines were produced centrally and 
shipped to dealers rather than being produced by the dealers themselves.35 
Competitive differences between the two methods chosen by 
McCormick and Singer are not significant, and a firm chose the one that 
was least costly and most effective for its own particular business. For 
McCormick’s bulky but fairly simple wooden reapers, authorizing local 
dealers to manufacture them saved transportation costs. Today, for many 
fast-food franchises the food itself is “manufactured” at the restaurant from 
local ingredients rather than shipped in finished form from the franchisor’s 
location. Coca-Cola sells and ships concentrated syrup to its franchised 
dealers, who then add water, carbon dioxide, and bottling, so in a real sense 
part of a finished Coke is manufactured centrally by the franchisor and part 
locally by each franchisee.36 By contrast, both today and in the past Ford 
automobiles were manufactured at a central plant and shipped to dealers, 
who prior to the sale did little more than cleanup and dealer prep work. The 
first sale doctrine limits Ford’s ability to impose post-delivery restraints on 
its automobiles, but not McCormick’s ability to restrain the resale of its 
locally manufactured reapers. This is because in the Ford case the dealers 
are receiving a manufactured product, while in the McCormick case they 
are receiving only a license to manufacture, which is not covered by the 
first sale doctrine. 
Patent law’s first sale rule states that once the patentee sells or 
authorizes the sale of a patented article, he has exhausted his rights with 
respect to that article and cannot restrain subsequent purchasers. The 
Court’s most forceful nineteenth century statement of the doctrine was 
Adams v. Burke, which was a vertical territorial restraint case.37 Adams 
involved a Civil War era patentee of coffin lids who had created a 
controlled distribution system by licensing various makers to produce them 
for sale in defined geographic areas and also restricted the areas in which 
 
35. See RUTH BRANDON, SINGER AND THE SEWING MACHINE: A CAPITALIST 
ROMANCE (1977); Andrew Godley, Selling the Sewing Machine Around the World: 
Singer’s International Marketing Strategies, 1850–1920, 7 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 266, 
272, 280–87 (2006); Andrew B. Jack, The Channels of Distribution for an Innovation: 
The Sewing-Machine Industry in America, 1860–1865, 9 EXPLORATIONS IN 
ENTREPRENEURIAL HISTORY 113, 127–31 (1957). 
36. See MARK PENDERGRAST, FOR GOD, COUNTRY, AND COCA-COLA: THE 
DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SOFT DRINK AND THE COMPANY THAT 
MAKES IT 71 (2000). 
37. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873). For a fuller statement of the facts, see Adams v. 
Burks, 1 F. Cas. 100 (C.C. Mass. 1871) (No. 50). The Supreme Court originally announced 
the doctrine in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1853) (“[W]hen the 
machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the [patent] 
monopoly.”). 
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the lids could be used. The firm of Lockhart and Seelye had acquired the 
right to make and sell the coffin lids within ten miles of Boston, while 
Adams had the right to make and sell them everywhere else. Lockhart and 
Seelye then manufactured the lid in question and placed it on a coffin that it 
sold to Burke, a mortician who used the coffin for a burial in Natick, 
Massachusetts, about seventeen miles from Boston. The patentee claimed 
that the burial violated the terms of the territorial limitation in the patent 
license and thus constituted infringement.38 
The Court assumed that the geographic restriction imposed on 
Lockhart and Seelye’s manufacturing license was enforceable, but that 
once a finished coffin lid was produced and sold to another, the purchaser 
took it free and clear of all patent obligations and could use the lid for a 
burial wherever he pleased. As a result, long before the antitrust laws were 
passed, the first sale doctrine performed an “antitrust” function through the 
patent licensing system by limiting the ability of manufacturers to impose 
territorial restraints on the resale of products. As the Supreme Court 
stated: 
[I]n the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the person 
having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in 
its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the 
right to restrict that use. The article, in the language of the court, 
passes without the limit of the monopoly. That is to say, the patentee 
or his assignee having in the act of sale received all the royalty or 
consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in that 
particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser 
without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the 
patentees.39 
The Supreme Court extended the first sale rule to copyrights in 
1908, in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, which refused to enforce a resale 
price maintenance restriction created in the context of an early restricted 
distribution system.40 Bobbs-Merrill published The Castaway, a novel 
written by Hallie Ermine Rives, a writer of popular and historical novels 
 
38. Burke, 84 U.S. at 454. 
39. Id. at 456; see also Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 664 (1895) 
(finding a bedstead patentee could not enforce a territorial limitation against a subsequent 
purchaser). Some early cases raised an issue analogous to first sale when patentees attempted 
to draft patents so as to cover both machines and consumables that would be used in them. 
See Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894) 
(finding the patentee’s combination patent covered both a device for dispensing toilet paper 
rolls and the consumable rolls themselves). The Morgan Envelope Court rejected the claim 
covering the rolls and held that it was not infringement for users of the device to purchase 
their toilet paper elsewhere. Id. at 432–33. 
40. 210 U.S. 339, 349–51 (1908). 
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and books on etiquette.41 The book contained a notice printed on the 
copyright page prohibiting anyone from reselling the book for less than 
$1.00 per copy. Macy’s stores had purchased the book from a distributor 
and then resold it to a customer for 89 cents. Relying on both the patent 
exhaustion cases and the general policy against restraints on alienation, the 
Court held that the sale of the book exhausted all rights conferred by the 
Copyright Act, leaving Macy’s free to resell it at any price it chose. 42 
Significantly for the development of future distribution law, the Court 
observed that the price restriction was contained in the copyright license 
and not in a distribution contract that the publisher had with Macy’s 
department stores. Macy’s was not in privity of contract with the publisher, 
and the case had been presented and argued completely as one of copyright 
infringement rather than breach of a distribution contract.43 That distinction 
was to prove critical in the future. As the law stood in 1908, any post-sale 
restraint on a patented or copyrighted article that was imposed by means of 
a licensing restriction and enforced by an infringement action was 
unenforceable. However, the courts had not yet addressed the legality of 
restricted distribution agreements under the Sherman Act. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the first sale doctrine has 
been largely consistent and absolute through most of its history. The 
doctrine applies no matter how competitively structured the market is, and 
whether or not anyone is excluded—that is, it reaches far beyond 
conventional antitrust analysis. The first sale rule applies equally to 
intrabrand restraints, such as location clauses or resale price maintenance, 
and also to interbrand restraints such as tying or exclusive dealing. The rule 
applies whether or not the restraint in question serves to promote or restrain 
innovation; indeed, that question is not even relevant. The Court’s 
reaffirmance of the first sale doctrine in the 2008 Quanta decision stated it 
 
41. HALLIE ERMINIE RIVES, THE CASTAWAY (1904). 
42. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350–51. 
43. See id. at 346, 350: 
The learned counsel for the appellant in this case, in the argument at bar, 
disclaims relief because of any contract, and relies solely upon the copyright 
statutes, and rights therein conferred. . . . There is no claim in this case of 
contract limitation, nor license agreement controlling the subsequent sales of 
the book . . . . In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of 
the copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create the 
right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this case, a limitation at 
which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom there is 
no privity of contract. 
Cf. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7 (2008) (refusing to 
decide whether application of first sale doctrine had any implications for breach of 
contract suits). 
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in this broad, unqualified way,44 despite the Court’s recognition after more 
than 30 years of antitrust jurisprudence that most post-sale restraints are 
competitively harmless. 
There have been two important historical exceptions to this consistent 
and aggressive application of the first sale rule, one very briefly recognized 
by the Supreme Court and one recognized nearly a century later by the 
Federal Circuit. The first exception was a pair of decisions written by 
Justice Lurton in 1896 and 1912, the first when he was on the Sixth Circuit 
and the second after his appointment to the Supreme Court. Both decisions 
involved tying arrangements with a patented tying product and unpatented 
tied products, a practice that would later become the subject of sharp 
antitrust controversy. In the Button-Fastener case in 1896, the Sixth Circuit 
held that the first sale rule did not undermine a license restriction requiring 
purchasers of the patentee’s patented button fastening machine to use only 
its own fastening staples. 45 The restriction was written in the form of a 
servitude, with a right of reverter upon violation. Judge Lurton effectively 
turned the first sale doctrine into a licensing default rule by holding that it 
applied only to “unconditional” sales. Clearly, he reasoned, a patentee’s 
right to “use” his invention implied the right to license others subject to 
similar use restrictions—that is, if the patentee could use his patented 
fastener only with his own staples, he could also place the same restriction 
on licensees.46 The only limitation that Lurton recognized on this power 
was where a monopoly in the “unpatented article” might be created.47 In 
the present case, however, there was no prospect of monopoly in the 
unpatented staples, and the patentee’s only apparent purpose in using the 
tie was to meter use of the machine for purposes of computing royalties.48 
Such a use “may or may not result in the engrossment of the market for 
staples,” and there was no evidence that it did so in this case.49 
Judge Lurton ignored the Supreme Court’s concern with restraints on 
alienation and attempted to import a competition policy into the first sale 
 
44. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 636–37. 
45. Heaton-Penninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 
289–90 (6th Cir. 1896). The restriction read: “This machine is sold and purchased to use 
only with fasteners made by the Peninsular Novelty Company, to whom the title to said 
machine immediately reverts upon violation of this contract of sale.” Id. at 290. 
46. Id. at 292 (“If, then, the patentee has the exclusive right to the use of his 
invention or discovery, during the term of his patent, it would seem to follow that any 
use by another, unauthorized by the patentee, would be an infringement of his 
monopoly.”). 
47. Id. at 294. 
48. See id. at 296 (“The fasteners are thus made the counters by which the royalty 
proportioned to the actual use of the machine is determined.”). 
49. Id. 
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doctrine by holding that a post-sale tying restraint ought to be unlawful 
only if it led to a monopoly in the tied product. Lurton’s analysis is 
remarkably similar to the way the Supreme Court began assessing tying 
arrangements under the antitrust laws a generation later. Even in that case, 
Lurton suggested, the monopoly in fasteners would not be odious if it 
resulted from the superiority of the patentee’s stapling machine.50 Except 
for a possible reference to restraints on trade, the opinion never cited the 
Sherman Act, which had been passed six years earlier.51 
Judge Lurton was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1909 by 
President Taft, who had also been a Judge on the Sixth Circuit and had 
been on the panel with Judge Lurton in the Button-Fastener case. In 1912, 
Lurton wrote the Court’s opinion in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., stating in a 
shorter version what he had said earlier in the Button-Fastener case.52 In 
this case the patentee posted a license on its mimeograph copy machine 
requiring purchasers to use its paper, ink, and stencils exclusively. It sold a 
copy of the machine with the affixed license to Christina B. Skou, who 
subsequently purchased a can of ink from Sidney Henry, an office supply 
salesman, in violation of the restriction. The machine itself was sold at a 
price of cost or less, indicating that A.B. Dick was earning its profits from 
the tied supplies, and thus probably using the tie as a price discrimination 
device, effectively earning a higher rate of return from higher volume 
users.53 The action was brought against Henry for contributory patent 
 
50. Id. Judge Lurton did rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in American Cotton-
Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882), in which the patentee sold metal ties for cotton 
bales with a printed restriction that they were authorized for a single use only. The 
defendant was in the business of salvaging the used ties and piecing them together for 
resale. The Supreme Court found infringement, but did not address the first sale issue. 
Rather, it held that the defendant’s conduct in piecing the broken parts of the ties 
together constituted a reconstruction rather than a repair of the ties, and thus constituted 
patent infringement. 
51. The possible reference is this passage: 
This brings us to consider the objections urged against the rather novel 
restrictions contained in the licenses granted by complainant. The very able 
counsel for appellees have urged very forcibly an argument based upon 
principles of public policy in respect of monopolies and contracts in restraint 
of trade, and have contended that public policy forbids a patentee from so 
contracting with reference to his monopoly as to create another monopoly in an 
unpatented article. 
Id. at 292. The court rejected the contention with no further reference to the public policy 
against monopolies and contracts in restraint of trade, concluding that any monopoly 
created by the restriction was justifiably within the patent grant. Id. at 296. 
52. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled by Motion Picture Patents 
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
53. On this fact, see Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1913) 
(characterizing the facts of Henry). When the dominant firm shifts the monopoly 
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infringement.54 Once again, Lurton distinguished conditional and 
unconditional sales and held that the first sale doctrine did not preclude 
enforcement of a restraint contained in a conditioned sale. The reasoning 
was mainly that, because the patentee could refuse to sell altogether, it 
could sell subject to any condition it pleased. The Court pointed out that no 
monopoly of the tied stencils, paper, and ink was in prospect: 
The stencil, the paper, and the ink made by the patentee, will continue 
to be unpatented. Anyone will be as free to make, sell, and use like 
articles as they would be without this restriction, save in one 
particular—namely, they may not be sold to a user of one of the 
patentee’s machines with intent that they shall be used in violation of 
the license.55 
In 1914 Congress responded to Henry by passing § 3 of the Clayton 
Act, which made anticompetitive ties unlawful whether the tying products 
were leased or sold, and whether they were patented or unpatented.56 
Henry was then resoundingly overruled by the Supreme Court in 1917 in 
the Motion Picture Patents decision, which is discussed later.57 While the 
Court found support for its decision condemning the patent tie in the newly 
passed Clayton Act, the decision’s analysis was based almost exclusively 
on the first sale doctrine.58 Motion Picture Patents is one of many 
situations in which the Supreme Court commingled the first sale doctrine 
 
overcharge to a tied product that is used in variable proportions, the rate of return on the 
package increases as the number of units of tied product increases. For example, suppose 
that the machine is sold at cost, $100, while the can of ink costs $5 and is sold for $15. If 
a buyer takes one unit of the machine and one can of ink the return is 
115(price)/105(cost), or 9.5%. If the buyers uses two cans of ink the return is 130/110, or 
18%. If the buyer uses ten cans of ink the return is 250/150, or 67%. The premise 
underlying such schemes is that more intense users value the machine by a greater 
amount than less intense users. On the use of ties as price discrimination devices, and 
impact on competition or consumers, see Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 9. 
54. Contributory infringement occurs when one knowingly aids or abets the 
infringement of someone else. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). Contributory infringement is 
not specified in the Copyright Act but is a judge made rule with similar requirements. 
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studies, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S 913, 930–31, 940–41 
(2005) (vacating summary judgment that did not find copyright contributory 
infringement); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 
(1984) (finding fair use defense by consumers undermined contributory infringement 
claim against provider of videotape recorder). 
55. Henry, 224 U.S. at 31–32. 
56. 15 U.S.C. § 14, 38 Stat. 731 (Oct. 15, 1914). 
57. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 
(1917) (“[T]he decision in Henry must be regarded as overruled.”) (citations omitted); 
see also infra notes 100–05 and accompanying text. 
58. See generally id. 
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and antitrust concerns so as to produce a unitary policy.59 
The second historical exception to first sale aggressiveness occurred 
more recently, when the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit revived 
Justice Lurton’s attempt to make the doctrine turn on realistic threats of 
monopoly.60 The Mallinckrodt case once again distinguished “conditional” 
sales, which occur when the patentee places restrictions on the rights of 
purchasers, thus conveying away less than its entire patent interest in the 
article in question.61 Because these conditions are couched in terms of 
the patentee’s withholding of a portion of its patent rights, violations of 
the restrictions are regarded as patent infringements.62 And because the 
first purchaser cannot transfer a larger interest than it owns, subsequent 
purchasers acquire the good subject to the same conditions and are also 
subject to patent infringement suits if the conditions are violated. 
Finally, this condition can be created either by agreement with the first 
purchaser, or simply by the patentee’s attachment of a notice to the 
patented article. The only limitation the court found on this ability to 
condition sales of patented goods is that the condition may not be one 
that falls outside of the patent grant—meaning that the condition may 
not violate the antitrust laws, constitute patent misuse, or be contrary to 
public policy for some other reason.63 In sum, the court created a 
patentee-initiated exception to the first sale doctrine for restraints that 
did not violate the antitrust laws or other competition policy. 
In its 2008 Quanta decision the Supreme Court unanimously rejected 
the Federal Circuit’s approach and restored the first sale rule to its original 
broad scope.64 “The authorized sale of an article that substantially 
embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the 
patent holder from invoking patent law to control post-sale use of the 
article.”65 The opinion failed to articulate any rationale for the doctrine 
other than naked precedent and stare decisis. The Court largely ignored 
the historical concern with restraints on alienation or the later concerns 
with competition policy. Following the views of the Solicitor General, it 
indicated that while conditions may be imposed at the time patented 
goods are sold, these must be done by means of license restrictions 
 
59. See infra notes 60–68 and accompanying text. 
60. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated by 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
61. Id. at 706–08; see also B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 
(Fed. Cir. 1997). 
62. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 706–08. 
63. Id. at 708. 
64. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 636–38 (2008). 
65. Id. at 638. 
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rather than conditional sales.66 This means that the conditions can be 
enforced only by breach of contracts suits, not by infringement suits, and 
only against persons who are in privity with respect to the contract that 
is being enforced. The Court expressed “no opinion on whether contract 
damages might be available even though exhaustion operates to 
eliminate patent damages.”67 
II. 
THE CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE AND 
COMPETITION POLICY 
The Quanta decision leaves the impression that the first sale doctrine 
never had anything to do with competition policy.68 But that is hardly the 
case. Most of the first sale cases in the century between Henry (1912) and 
Quanta (2008) involved either resale price maintenance or tying. While 
after Henry the Supreme Court was consistent in its application of the first 
sale rule, it also invariably linked the first sale doctrine to antitrust policy. 
For example, the technical requirements of the first sale doctrine itself also 
identified the boundary of unlawful RPM. Like the first sale doctrine, the 
rule against RPM applied only when there was a sale of an object and then 
a qualifying resale; it did not apply to services, processes, or production 
licenses.69 Whether tying law would also have tracked the first sale 
doctrine is difficult to say because § 3 of the Clayton Act intervened, 
making clear that antitrust tying rules applied to both sales and leases, and 
thus extending the range of antitrust into areas where the first sale doctrine 
would not apply. 
The aggressiveness with which the first sale rule was applied during 
this period is hardly surprising, and is not inconsistent with the proposition 
that the Supreme Court had competition policy in mind in first sale 
decisions. During the same period, the Supreme Court was regularly hostile 
toward these same restraints when they were analyzed under either antitrust 
 
66. Id. at 636–38. 
67. Id. at 637 n.7. The Court quoted the following passage from Keeler v. Standard 
Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895): 
Whether a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special contracts 
brought home to the purchasers is not a question before us, and upon which we 
express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a question would arise as 
a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and effect of 
the patent laws. 
68. The court’s only mention of the antitrust laws was a brief reference to the fact 
that the Univis Lens decision had contained an antitrust issue. See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 
627 (discussing United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 248–49 (1942)). Beyond 
that, the decision contains no discussion of competition policy. 
69. See infra notes 148–59 and accompanying text. 
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rules or misuse doctrine. Indeed, virtually every Supreme Court case that 
applied the first sale doctrine would have come out the same way70 under 
antitrust or, in procedurally appropriate circumstances,71 misuse doctrine. 
Many of the decisions expressly referenced the antitrust laws as well, just 
as Motion Picture Patents did.72 Henry was anomalous for two reasons: 
first, it deviated from Supreme Court first sale doctrine; second, it stood 
alone among Supreme Court decisions in its benign attitude toward patent 
tying arrangements—a position that was not to change until the late 
1970s.73 
Indeed, if the first sale doctrine does not find its purpose in either 
competition policy or innovation policy, then it is difficult to find any value 
for it other than precedent—a fact that did not trouble the Supreme Court in 
Quanta. Over history, most of the Supreme Court’s decisions on the first 
sale doctrine have attached its rationale to competition policy. Most 
decisions that have applied the rule have involved either tying 
arrangements or RPM, and the Court was typically not very subtle about 
noting that the first sale rule and antitrust law pulled in tandem. This trend 
was exacerbated by the extraordinary difficulty that courts have had in 
understanding the economics of restricted distribution. Lacking a rationale 
for explaining why vertical restrictions were anticompetitive in the 
traditional sense of leading to reduced output and higher prices, antitrust 
itself imported from the first sale doctrine the common law’s concern with 
restraints on alienation. 
A. Tying and Resale Price Maintenance, 1908–1917 
In its Dr. Miles decision, three years after Bobbs-Merrill, the Supreme 
Court cited both the first sale doctrine and the Sherman Act for the 
proposition that even an explicit RPM agreement between a manufacturer 
of a patent medicine and a retailer was contrary to legal policy.74 The Court 
 
70. That is, it would have refused to enforce the restriction—not that the first sale 
doctrine could justify an award of antitrust’s treble damages under 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) 
(2006). 
71. “Misuse” typically arises only as a defense to an infringement action. See 
Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 3). 
72. See infra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
73. The Supreme Court began to develop a more benign attitude toward tying in 
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) and U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977); see also AREEDA, ELHAUGE & HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 5, ¶ 1733. 
74. Interestingly, by that time Justice Lurton, who recused himself from Dr. Miles, 
was already on record as believing that resale price maintenance was unlawful under the 
antitrust laws. While on the Sixth Circuit he had written the Dr. Miles decision, which the 
Supreme Court ultimately affirmed. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 
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expressly incorporated the common law policy against restraints on 
alienation into its interpretation of the Sherman Act, quoting from Coke 
upon Littleton, an early seventeenth-century edition of a fifteenth century 
treatise on property law.75 Even the Schwinn decision more than a half 
century later, which condemned a dealer distribution system that involved 
territorial restraints, cited this “ancient rule against restraints on alienation” 
 
164 F. 803 (6th Cir. 1908), aff’d, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Lurton rested the rationale on the 
fact that Dr. Miles medicines were not patented and that the resale price maintenance 
agreement was imposed by contract rather than license agreement. One important difference, 
Lurton observed, was that a patent is of finite duration while contracts can be extended 
indefinitely. As a result any monopoly thereby created would be more odious: 
Any other conclusion would be to sanction a monopoly in that class of goods 
vastly more far-reaching than the monopoly extended upon high grounds of 
public policy to the inventor. The statutory monopoly has a limitation of a few 
years. To obtain it the inventor must put on record his invention. At the end of 
the term the public will be free to employ the discovery without the burden 
theretofore imposed as a compensation to the inventor. Not so with the 
monopoly asked for by those who control the enormous proprietary trade of 
this country. Their monopoly will go on forever. . . . 
See id. at 806. The strong implication was that if the medicines had been patented and the 
RPM carried out by patent license rather than distribution contract, Lurton would have 
applied his Button-Fastener and Henry analysis instead. In sum, for Lurton both tying and 
resale price maintenance were lawful if imposed on patent goods by means of a patent 
license. RPM was unlawful if imposed on unpatented goods by a simple contract. Soon-to-
be Supreme Court Justice Van Devanter, while still on the Eighth Circuit, took that same 
position with respect to resale price maintenance, holding that an RPM restriction placed on 
a license to resell patented goods could be enforced by means of a patent infringement 
action. See Nat’l Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128 F. 733 (8th Cir. 1904). By contrast, in 
Dr. Miles the Supreme Court found the resale price maintenance agreement to be fully 
covered by the first sale doctrine announced in Bobbs-Merrill. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 
405 (analogizing to facts of Bobbs-Merrill, observing that Dr. Miles’ medicines were 
neither patented nor copyrighted, and concluding that “It will hardly be contended, with 
respect to such a matter, that the manufacturer of an article of commerce not protected by 
any statutory grant is in any better case.”). 
75. The Court was referring to Lord Chief Justice Edward Coke’s statement that if 
someone 
be possessed . . . of a horse or of any other chattel, real or personal, and give or 
sell his whole interest or property therein, upon condition that the donee or 
vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void, because the whole interest 
and property is out of him, so as he hath no possibility of a reverter; and it is 
against trade and traffic and bargaining and contracting between man and man. 
Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 404–05 (quoting EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 360 (London, 
W. Clarke 16th ed. 1809) (1628). The Court also referenced John Chipman Gray’s 
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, §§ 27, 28 (2d ed. 1895). See supra notes 
3132 and accompanying text. Gray’s book never mentioned patented or copyrighted 
goods. 
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as a rationale for applying the antitrust laws.76 Schwinn did not connect a 
policy limiting restraints on alienation to lower output or higher prices. 
The Court finally repudiated this rationale for applying antitrust to 
distribution restraints in its 1977 Sylvania decision, which very largely 
brought an end to antitrust condemnation of nonprice distribution 
restraints.77 During the interval from Sylvania to Quanta, the Supreme 
Court never considered a first sale case and thus never had the opportunity 
to decide whether more lenient treatment of vertical nonprice restraints also 
entailed some loosening of the first sale doctrine. In its Leegin decision in 
2007, which overruled Dr. Miles, the Court rejected common law policies 
against restraints on alienation as a justification for the per se rule against 
RPM. Such rules, it said, reflected “formalistic line drawing” rather than 
“demonstrable economic effect.”78 By contrast, the Quanta decision a year 
later renewed the full-blown historical first sale doctrine with no mention 
of competition policy or, for that matter, any policy whatsoever except 
stare decisis. 
Following the first sale doctrine, the Sherman Act created a second 
body of federal law that could be applied to anticompetitive restrictions 
on sale and use. While patents were not mentioned in the Act, its 
passage occurred during a milieu of growing hostility toward big 
business. Increasingly, patents came to be viewed as one of the principal 
vehicles by which large firms perpetuated and extended their power. 
Early in the twentieth century, both patent doctrine and antitrust law 
evolved more aggressive and focused rules to deal with perceived 
problems of patent overreaching. Much of this development occurred as 
a result of the reaction to the Henry decision, which had held that a post-
sale tying condition on a patented good violated neither the first sale rule 
nor the Sherman Act.79 
While Henry’s formal demise did not occur until after § 3 of the 
Clayton Act was passed in 1914, the Court largely undermined it and 
 
76. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967) (“But to 
allow this freedom where the manufacturer has parted with dominion over the goods—
the usual marketing situation—would violate the ancient rule against restraints on 
alienation and open the door to exclusivity of outlets and limitation of territory further 
than prudence permits.”); see also id. at 391 (Stewart, J. concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing Coke upon Littleton and accusing the majority of embracing a 
legal rule “merely on grounds of its antiquity”). 
77. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–59 (1977). 
78. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887 (2007) 
(quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977)). 
79. Henry v. A.B. Dick & Co., 224 U.S. 1, 11 (1912), overruled by Motion Picture 
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); see also supra notes 54–57 
and accompanying text. 
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restored the original first sale doctrine in 1913 in a RPM case. In Bauer, 
decided a year after Henry, the Court held that the first sale doctrine 
precluded a firm from using a patent license restriction to impose RPM on 
a patented medicine called Sanatogen.80 The restriction was printed on each 
package of the medicine with a warning that a violation would lead to a 
patent infringement action.81 The Court had three choices: it could have 
followed Bobbs-Merrill by holding that the first sale doctrine rendered the 
RPM clause unenforceable, followed Henry by enforcing the restriction, or 
followed Dr. Miles, then only two years old, by holding that the license 
agreement amounted to an unlawful contract in restraint of trade. 
The Court followed both Bobbs-Merrill and Dr. Miles. As far as the 
first sale doctrine was concerned, the Court noted that Henry had 
distinguished Bobbs-Merrill by observing that the Patent Act, unlike the 
Copyright Act, gave the patentee the exclusive right to “use” its invention, 
and the tying restriction was a restriction on how the machine could be 
used.82 However, a price restriction is not a restriction on use; as a result, 
the sale of a unit of the drug deprived the patentee of any right to control 
the resale price of that unit.83 With respect to Dr. Miles, the Court observed 
that it had declared that RPM agreements were contrary to public policy 
and unenforceable.84 Of course, Congress had the power to create an 
exception in the Patent Act, but there was no evidence that it had done so. 
So Bauer was in fact a first sale decision, which observed consistency with 
the policy of the Sherman Act. 
The effective merger of the first sale rule and antitrust policy occurred 
in two decisions issued on the same day in April 1917. Straus v. Victor 
Talking Machine involved RPM, and the much better known Motion 
Picture Patents decision involved a tying arrangement.85 The facts of 
Straus suggest a ham-handed attempt to evade Dr. Miles, which had 
condemned contractual RPM, and also Bauer, which had involved a post-
sale restraint on the sale of a patented product, by using what purported to 
be a non-sale patent license instead. The patentee “licensed” a phonograph 
 
80. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913). 
81. Id. at 8: 
This size package of Sanatogen is licensed by us for sale and use at a price not 
less than one dollar ($1). Any sale in violation of this condition, or use when 
so sold, will constitute an infringement of our patent No. 601,995, under which 
Sanatogen is manufactured, and all persons so selling or using packages or 
contents will be liable to injunction and damages. 
82. Id. at 15. 
83. Id. at 15–16. 
84. Id. at 12. 
85. Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917); Motion Picture 
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
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machine to dealers, together with the right to “sublicense” the machine to 
customers.86 The license restrictions included both a tying clause requiring 
the use of the patentee’s needles and other supplies, and also a clause 
stipulating the minimum price at which the machine could be transferred 
from dealers to customers.87 While denominated a “license,” these transfers 
of the phonograph resembled sales in every other respect. The patentee 
brought a patent infringement action against a New York merchant who 
undercut the stipulated price.88 
The Court found that the scheme was “in substance, the one dealt with 
by this court in Dr. Miles . . . and in Bauer” and that the license language 
was a subterfuge to disguise what was in fact a sale.89 It then declared the 
condition unenforceable, relying mainly on first sale cases extending back 
to Adams v. Burke.90 
Motion Picture Patents is far better known than Straus, and its 
language is a swirl of ideas that determined the future course of the first 
sale doctrine, misuse doctrine, and antitrust.91 In 1914 an angry Congress 
responded to the Henry decision by passing § 3 of the Clayton Act, 
which condemned anticompetitive ties, including those involving 
patented tying products.92 In Motion Picture Patents the Supreme Court 
overruled Henry. It also gave the first hints of what subsequently would 
become the doctrine of patent “misuse,” an affirmative defense in a 
patent infringement action that occurs when a patentee is said to have 
 
86. Straus, 243 U.S. at 491. 
87. Id. at 494–95. 
88. Id. at 496. 
89. Id. at 498. 
90. Id. at 501 (citing Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873)); see 
supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. A year later, in Boston Store of Chicago v. 
American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918), the Supreme Court struck down under the 
first sale doctrine a license restriction compelling resale price maintenance. 
Since Dr. Miles had been written six years earlier, there was no question that a contract 
imposing resale price maintenance was unlawful and unenforceable. But the Supreme Court 
made clear that one could not accomplish the same purpose by means of a license restriction. 
In so doing it applied the orthodox first sale rule, that: 
by virtue of the patent law one who had sold a patented machine and received 
the price and had thus placed the machine so sold beyond the confines of the 
patent law, could not by qualifying restrictions as to use keep under the patent 
monopoly a subject to which the monopoly no longer applied. 
Straus, 243 U.S. at 24. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brandeis protested that the legality of 
resale price maintenance “is an economic question” which requires analysis of the market 
facts. Id. at 28 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
91. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
92. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006). 
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expanded the scope of its patent improperly.93 
Motion Picture Patents condemned an arrangement under which 
the seller of a theater motion picture projector limited its use to the 
showing of the seller’s own films. The restriction was a lingering portion 
of a failed attempt by interests who owned Thomas Edison’s projector and 
film patents94 to monopolize the entire United States motion picture 
industry. The attempt even included blacklisting actors and actresses who 
had agreed to work on films produced by competitors of the Company.95 
By the time the Supreme Court decided the case, the monopoly had fallen 
apart. Nevertheless, the Clayton Act had been passed and the Court used 
Motion Picture Patents as an opportunity to state that the new statute 
“confirmed” its pre-Henry first sale cases. 
Today Motion Picture Patents is widely treated as both an early 
patent “misuse” decision96 as well as an antitrust decision.97 In fact, its 
 
93. See, e.g., Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31–33 (1931) 
(finding tying of dry ice to patented ice box constituted misuse and rejecting patentee’s 
attempt to distinguish Motion Picture Patents by pointing out that, as in Henry, tied products 
were essential to functioning of patented product); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 
314 U.S. 488, 489 (1942) (tying of salt to salt injecting machine used by canners resulted in 
misuse). 
94. While not the earliest inventor, Edison was one of the earliest commercial 
developers of the sprocketed projector take up wheel and film with little holes on the 
side that engaged the sprocket, thus permitting the film to run smoothly and eliminating 
the jerkiness that often appeared in very early motion pictures. Ownership of the 
technology itself was disputed. See Charles Musser, The Emergence of Cinema: The 
American Screen to 1907, at 130–80, in HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CINEMA (Charles 
Harpole ed., Scribner’s 1990). 
95. For background history on the business practices of the motion picture 
industry, see MICHAEL CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY: 
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 16–21 (1960); BENJAMIN B. HAMPTON, A HISTORY OF 
THE MOVIES (THE LITERATURE OF CINEMA) 8–11, 17–24, 34, 64–76, 79–81 (1931); 
LEWIS JACOBS, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN FILM: A CRITICAL HISTORY, 1921–1947, at 
81–85, 88, 164–65, 291–92 (1939). 
96. See AREEDA, ELHAUGE & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1781; HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, IP AND 
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW, ch. 3 (2d ed. 2010); ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 331 (rev. 4th ed. 2007) 
(reprinting Motion Picture Patents as a misuse decision in the casebook); Bohannan, supra 
note 21 (manuscript at 4); Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 904–06 (2007). 
97. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517–18 
(1917). In Motion Picture Patents, the Court stated it was “confirmed” in its conclusion by 
the recently passed § 3 of the Clayton Act; its conclusion on the first sale doctrine, however, 
made it “unnecessary to make the application of this statute to the case at bar.” Id. at 517. 
Nevertheless, the Clayton Act provision was “a most persuasive expression of the public 
policy of our country with respect to the question before us.” Id. 
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analysis is mainly of patent “exhaustion,” or first sale. As the Court 
wrote: 
[T]he right to vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the 
article sold being thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent 
law and rendered free of every restriction which the vendor may 
attempt to put upon it. The statutory authority to grant the exclusive 
right to ‘use’ a patented machine is not greater, indeed, it is precisely 
the same, as the authority to grant the exclusive right to ‘vend,’ and, 
looking to that authority, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we are 
convinced that the exclusive right granted in every patent must be 
limited to the invention described in the claims of the patent, and that it 
is not competent for the owner of a patent, by notice attached to its 
machine, to, in effect, extend the scope of its patent monopoly by 
restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its operation, but 
which are no part of the patented invention, or to send its machines 
forth into the channels of trade of the country subject to conditions as 
to use or royalty to be paid, to be imposed thereafter at the discretion 
of such patent owner. The patent law furnishes no warrant for such a 
practice, and the cost, inconvenience, and annoyance to the public 
which the opposite conclusion would occasion forbid it.98 
B. The First Sale Rule in the Development of Modern Competition Policy 
As they became more refined and technical, the developing 
doctrines of exhaustion, antitrust, and misuse all addressed practices 
thought to be anticompetitive, such as tying, but they also moved in 
different directions. Briefly: 
The first sale rule, which was entirely judge-made in patent and 
added to the copyright statute only in 1976,99 applied only to sales of the 
patented or copyrighted good. The remedy was non-enforcement of the 
restriction, or alternatively, a defense to an infringement action for 
violating the restriction. As the Supreme Court summarized the doctrine 
in its recent Quanta decision, the rule applies without any inquiry into 
 
98. Id. at 515–16. 
99. In copyright, Congress addressed the problem by expressly permitting parties 
to contract around the first sale doctrine, but then limiting the parties to contract 
remedies if they do so. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (stating first sale doctrine); House 
Committee, Notes accompanying section 109(a), Notes of Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693; see 
generally Bohannan, supra note 1; David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer 
Program Copies and the Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157 
(1990) (discussing copy use license agreements as a method to contract around the first 
sale doctrine). 
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either competitive effects or innovative restraint.100 
Misuse, another judge-made doctrine that was not fully developed 
until the 1942 Morton Salt decision,101 could apply to both sales and 
leases of a patented good as well as licenses; thus it applied in many 
situations when the first sale doctrine would not. Misuse served as a 
defense to an infringement action, but under Morton Salt the patent 
became unenforceable against all infringers until such time as the misuse 
was purged. The law developed antitrust-like criteria for determining 
when patent misuse occurs, although current law reaches more broadly 
in copyright misuse cases.102 
If the appropriate anticompetitive effects are shown a restraint can 
also violate the antitrust laws, passed by statute in 1890103 and 1914,104 
and provide the basis for an affirmative challenge by the government in 
an equity case or by private plaintiffs seeking treble damages or an 
injunction. The Clayton Act provision applies equally to the sale of 
patented products, leases, and to licenses.105 
In subsequent legal development, patent misuse law loosely tracked 
antitrust principles.106 Patent misuse has been a broader concept in the 
case law, however, particularly in that of the Federal Circuit,107 and 
 
100. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 630 (2008). 
101. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490 (1942). 
102. For more information on the scope of misuse, see Bohannan, supra note 21. 
103. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1–7, 26 Stat. 209, 209–10 (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–7 (2006)). 
104. Primarily section 3 of the Clayton Act. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 730, 
731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006)). 
105. See, e.g., Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (condemning salt 
tie); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (condemning a lease 
requiring the lessees of tabulating machines to use the lessor’s punch cards). 
106. See, e.g., AREEDA, ELHAUGE, & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1781 (advocating a 
relatively close adherence to antitrust principles); HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY & LESLIE, 
supra note 99, ch. 3, § 3.2 (noting that misuse doctrine is largely coextensive with antitrust 
doctrine, though the Federal Circuit has held misuse doctrine to be broader); Cotter, supra 
note 99, at 949–59 (arguing that misuse should follow antitrust principles). But see 
Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 46) (arguing that misuse should apply when there is 
an antitrust violation, an unreasonable restraint on innovation, or an unreasonable 
sequestering of public domain information or technology). 
107. See, e.g., Princo v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (finding proof of an antitrust violation insufficient to show misuse where the 
conduct was not actually outside scope of the patent grant); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 
803 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding potential misuse for tying even though 
antitrust’s “separate products”-requirement was not met); cf. Transitron Elec. Corp. v. 
Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885, 892 (D. Mass. 1980) (“[P]atent misuse may be seen 
as having a less stringent standing requirement and a lesser burden of proof than an antitrust 
claim.”), aff’d, 649 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1981). Contra USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., 694 F.2d 
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copyright misuse is broader still.108 The first sale doctrine has never been 
cabined in this way, and under Quanta applies without any query into 
harmful effects. So the operative distinctions are that the first sale 
doctrine is substantively broader, reaching even conditions not seen as 
anticompetitive or in violation of antitrust law or as restraints on 
innovation. However, the doctrine is more limited in the sense that it 
applies only to the authorized sale of a patented or copyrighted article, 
not to leases or licenses. 
The result is far too much doctrine, pointing in too many different 
directions. Further, the first sale doctrine fails to address in any 
comprehensive way the two policy concerns that should be fundamental 
to the analysis of such restraints. First, they must not impair competition 
unreasonably, with “competition” defined as the state of affairs when 
prices are kept close to cost and output is maximized. Second, they must 
not serve unreasonably to restrain innovation or sequester the public 
domain. Antitrust policy is concerned with competition but has had great 
difficulty developing good theory about when such restraints are 
anticompetitive. By contrast, both the first sale rule and IP misuse are 
thought of as developing within IP, where the underlying goal is to 
further innovation. But facilitation of innovation has never been 
articulated as a goal of first sale doctrine. 
In its pre-Quanta case law the Supreme Court had developed 
rationales for the first sale doctrine other than limiting restraints on 
alienation. These concerns then bled into both antitrust policy and the IP 
law of foreclosure. 
1. Multiple Royalties and Leveraging 
One historical concern that the courts raised in first sale cases was 
that permitting the patentee to place post-sale license restrictions on 
patented goods would entitle the patentee to collect multiple royalties. 
This concern appeared and reappeared in the law of the first sale 
doctrine and later merged into both the doctrine of patent misuse and the 
antitrust law of tying arrangements. As early as 1863 the Supreme Court 
declared that the first sale doctrine was essential because patentees: 
 
505, 511–12 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding patent misuse should be addressed under antitrust 
principles), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983). 
108. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., No. C 08-03251 WHA, 2009 WL 303046, 
at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2009) (recognizing possible copyright misuse claim even though 
antitrust claim had been dismissed); Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 
350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting copyright misuse could be found without an 
antitrust violation); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978–79 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(finding copyright misuse without any corresponding violation of antitrust law); see also 
Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 13–14). 
NYU POST SALE RESTRAINTS 15 FEB 2011 2/15/2011  6:06 AM 
126 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW  
 
are entitled to but one royalty for a patented machine, and 
consequently when a patentee has himself constructed the machine and 
sold it, or authorized another to construct and sell it, or to construct and 
use and operate it, and the consideration has been paid to him for the 
right, he has then to that extent parted with his monopoly, and ceased to 
have any interest whatever in the machine so sold or so authorized to be 
constructed and operated.109 
That concern was most recently stated by the now vindicated 
district court decision in Quanta, which justified the first sale doctrine as 
prohibiting “double” royalties.110 
This concern about double monopoly profits was largely the same 
as the concern that drove patent tying misuse cases, as well as those 
involving contractual extensions of royalty-like payments. For example, 
in the Carbice decision, which applied the first sale doctrine but was 
treated later as a misuse case, Justice Brandeis opined that a patentee’s 
tie of a refrigerated transport box to its dry ice refrigerant was bad 
because it enabled the patentee to earn a monopoly profit not merely on 
the box but also on the unpatented ice.111 And in Brulotte v. Thys, which 
applied patent misuse doctrine, Justice Douglas declared that contracts 
requiring post-expiration payments akin to royalties were bad because 
they enabled the patentee to multiply the amount of royalties that it 
could receive: “[T]o use that leverage [of the patent] to project those 
 
109. Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 350 (1863); see also United States v. 
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) (determination of exhaustion rests on “whether or 
not there has been such a disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the patentee 
has received his reward for the use of the article”). 
110. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., No. C 01-00326 CW, 2002 WL 
31996860, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug 20, 2002) (first sale doctrine “designed to prevent a patentee 
from receiving a double royalty on a single patented invention”), clarified by 248 F. Supp. 
2d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2003), rev’d sub nom. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev’d sub. nom. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 
617 (2008). On the question of whether a sale was “authorized,” see Gen. Talking Pictures 
Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 126 (1938) (“[A]s [buyer] ordered, purchased and 
leased [patented products from licensee] knowing [licensee was not authorized to sell for 
that purpose], [buyer] also was an infringer.”). 
111. Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1931) (internal 
citations omitted) (opining that patent tie enabled 
[T]he patent-owner to “derive its profit, not from the invention on which the 
law gives it a monopoly, but from the unpatented supplies with which it is 
used” [and which are] “wholly without the scope of the patent monopoly.” If a 
monopoly could be so expanded, the owner of a patent for a product might 
conceivably monopolize the commerce in a large part of [the] unpatented 
materials used in its manufacture. The owner of a patent for a machine might 
thereby secure a partial monopoly on the unpatented supplies consumed in its 
operation.). 
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royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort 
to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tying the sale or use of the 
patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented ones.”112 
In the 1950s, this leverage theory of monopoly tying was largely 
discredited by Chicago School writers, who showed that a monopolist of 
a product that uses complements or that is subject to further downstream 
sales can earn all of the available monopoly profits in the initial sale of 
the primary monopoly product itself.113 Or to say this differently, in any 
multi-stage distribution chain there is but a single monopoly profit to be 
earned. For example, customers’ willingness-to-pay for the ice box in 
the Carbice case is a function of their willingness-to-pay for the ice box 
and dry ice combination. One who sells both products together can 
charge the monopoly price for one or the other or spread it over some 
combination of the two. But it cannot charge the full monopoly price for 
the box, predicated on a competitive price for the ice, and then charge a 
second monopoly price for the ice. 
The first sale doctrine was historically justified by a variation of the 
leverage theory, but the Chicago School showed that one who owns a 
patented good subject to subsequent downstream resales or uses as a 
component in another product can charge a price in the primary 
transaction that gives it the full markup that is available from 
downstream purchasers or other users. To illustrate, suppose the patentee 
sells a patented microprocessor to Alpha Company, which places the 
chip on a memory circuit board and then sells the board to Beta 
Company, which installs the board as a component in a computer.114 The 
patentee might be able to collect a $5 royalty from Alpha and use the 
license restriction to obtain an additional $3 royalty from Beta. 
Alternatively, it could charge the entire $8 markup to Alpha, who 
presumably would pass on the $3 charge in its transaction with Beta. But 
assuming that the profit-maximizing value of the royalties in this 
distribution chain is $8 for a single monopolist, the patentee could not 
profitably charge an $8 royalty to Alpha plus the $3 royalty to Beta. The 
first sale doctrine would require the patentee to obtain the entire $8 
 
112. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). 
113. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 
67 YALE L.J. 19 (1958); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE 
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §10.6a (3d ed. 2005). For a recent attempt to restore 
a version of the leverage theory, see Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the 
Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 409–10, 431 n.89 
(2009). For a reply defending the established arguments against leveraging, see 
Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 9. 
114. The facts loosely track those of the Quanta decision. See Quanta Computer, 
Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 623–24 (2008). 
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royalty charge from Alpha, leaving Alpha free to charge whatever it 
needed to in its secondary transaction with Beta, but the profit earned by 
patentee is substantially the same either way. 
2. Transaction Costs, Holdup, and Notice 
In the simple story the first sale doctrine reduces downstream 
transaction costs: the patentee obtains its entire $8 in its initial 
transaction with Alpha, the first purchaser. If it obtains only $5 from 
Alpha it must then search out Beta, who purchases subsequently from 
Alpha, in order to collect the additional $3 of royalty that its patent 
position makes available. Further, the firms in Beta’s position might be 
numerous and perhaps hard to identify. Indeed, spreading out the royalty 
obligation can create information costs on both sides. First, it may be 
difficult and costly for the patentee to identify the firms in Beta’s 
position—certainly more difficult than simply charging the full royalty 
in the initial transaction with Alpha. Of course, to the extent this is a 
problem it seems to be self-correcting. Why would the patentee divide 
its royalty between Alpha and the Betas if it believed it would ultimately 
not be able to find and collect the full value of the Betas’ royalty 
obligations? It would accordingly charge the full royalty to Alpha and 
leave Alpha to pass on whatever it could in its transactions with Beta. 
The story on the other side of the transaction is somewhat different, 
particularly in a market in which license terms are difficult to discover. 
Suppose that the patentee assesses the post-sale license requirement in 
its initial transaction with Alpha but that subsequent Betas purchasing 
from Alpha do not all have notice of the restriction. They may pay Alpha 
too much because they find out only after the transaction has been 
consummated that they also owe $3 to the patentee. The fact that 
subsequent purchasers did not know about the restriction is generally not 
a defense in a patent infringement action.115 As a result, they will take 
more of the patentee’s chip than they would otherwise have purchased, 
or they may forego a rival’s chip that would have been a better choice 
had they known the true cost of this patentee’s chip. 
An ineffectively communicated post-sale restriction can yield 
overconsumption by indirect purchasers because they did not have 
adequate notice of the restriction at the time they purchased the 
 
115. Patent liability is a strict liability offense and lack of knowledge of the patent 
is not a defense; in cases of license restrictions, it essentially means the potential 
infringer has no license and therefore is guilty of infringement. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, 
Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525 (2007); 
Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to patent Infringement, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 475 (2006); Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 92 (May 2006). 
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technology. This problem is potentially quite serious given that patent 
licenses, as opposed to patents themselves, are not recorded and 
publicized in a searchable form.116 If the patentee can catch downstream 
violators by surprise it will be in a position to extract much higher 
royalty rates than it could if the infringement notification were more 
timely.117 For example, computer assemblers selecting components from 
Intel without notice of the conditional sale from LG to Intel would make 
that choice on the premise that all IP rights necessary for the use of such 
products traveled with the sale. That would affect their decision to use 
Intel components rather than those of a rival. However, they might find 
out later that they owe another royalty to LG, only after they have made 
structural commitments to Intel’s technology. 
One reason for post-sale infringement claims, as in the Quanta 
case, may be to defer royalty negotiation until after the purchaser has 
made a commitment from which reversal is costly. If the patentee were 
required to charge its full royalty to the initial purchaser, who is 
uncommitted as to technology and in competition with others, then the 
royalty charged would reflect quite a different set of market realities.118 
But this problem can be addressed by making timely notice a 
condition of enforcement, which was the approach that Justice Lurton 
 
116. See Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 257, 257 (2008); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and 
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2022 (2007); Richard H. Stern, Post-Sale Patent 
Restrictions After Mallinckrodt – An Idea in Search of Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 
12–19 (1994). 
117. The situation is analogous to the patent holdup problem that occurs when a 
participant in a standard setting process surreptitiously files patent continuations on a 
previously existing patent, writing on technology that the standard setting organization is in 
the process of adopting, and surprising them with its patent after participants are locked in. 
See, e.g., Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C., Aug. 2, 2006), vacated, 522 
F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1318 (2009); see also Hynix 
Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (refusing 
to strike pre-trial jury demand with respect to above described claims); Union Oil Co. of 
Calif., No. 9305, 2004 FTC LEXIS 115 (F.T.C., July 7, 2004) (discussing liability for 
misrepresentations made to a state agency in the process of promulgating standards); PHILLIP 
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 712 (3d ed. 2008); JAMES BESSEN & 
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT 
INNOVATORS AT RISK 62–65 (2008); Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse 
of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 79 n.62 (2004). 
118. Cf. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 2, at 29 (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (“If . . . [a] producer learns that it has 
infringed a patent only after it has committed sunk costs to its . . . production—and [is] thus 
locked in to the effort—the patentee may be in a position to demand supra-competitive 
royalty rates.”). 
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took for the Supreme Court in Henry. Although the Court set the first 
sale rule aside under the circumstances of that case, he limited 
infringement actions to situations where the purchaser had “notice that 
he buys with only a qualified right of use. He has a right to assume, in 
the absence of knowledge, that the seller passes an unconditional title to 
the machine, with no limitations upon the use . . . .”119 As noted later, the 
law of real property servitudes requires either privity of contract or 
effective and timely notice as a prerequisite to enforcement,120 and IP 
law should do the same. 
In Henry, as in Motion Picture Patents, a notice of the requirement 
that purchasers of the machine use only the patentee’s aftermarket 
products was attached to the machine,121 so one can assume that the 
original purchaser of the machine had notice. Subsequent purchasers 
probably had notice as well, assuming that the notice had not been 
removed. What made Henry interesting, however, was that Henry 
himself was not a purchaser of the machine at all, but rather a stationer 
who sold ink to the machine’s owner with knowledge and the 
“expectation” that the ink would be used in the machine in conflict with 
the notice restriction.122 That makes the Henry facts a little unusual, 
because ordinarily an office supply store selling ink would not be in a 
position to know what kind of notice is printed on an ink-consuming 
machine back at the purchaser’s office. A breach of contract action 
against Henry would not have worked, since he was not in privity of 
contract with A.B. Dick. Presumably, the Supreme Court would not have 
permitted A.B. Dick to pursue its infringement claim in the more typical 
case where the seller of a commodity had no knowledge of precisely 
how it was going to be used. However, the law of contributory 
infringement, unlike the law of direct infringement, does require notice, 
and clearly did so require when Henry was decided.123 
In Adams, where the Supreme Court first developed the first sale 
rule, it did not discuss notice, although the lower court appeared to 
assume that notice existed.124 In Bobbs-Merrill, which applied the first 
 
119. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 26 (1912), overruled by Motion Picture 
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 56–60. 
120. See infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text. 
121. Henry, 224 U.S. at 11. 
122. Id. at 11–12. 
123. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006). On the requirement in the early twentieth 
century, see Cortelyou v. Charles E. Johnson & Co., 145 F. 933, 935–37 (2d Cir. 1906) 
(dismissing contributory infringement claim because defendant lacked notice of 
restriction), aff’d, 207 U.S. 196 (1907). 
124. See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873); Adams v. Burks, 1 F. Cas. 
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sale rule, the license restriction limiting the resale price was printed in 
the copies of each book, so the subsequent seller clearly had notice of it, 
as the Court’s opinion observed.125 In the Federal Circuit’s more recent 
Mallinckrodt decision, more or less following Henry, the infringement 
defendant had actual knowledge of the “single use only” restriction that 
it violated.126 Because notice was not in dispute the court left for another 
day the question of what type of notice would be sufficient; clearly, 
however, it assumed that notice of some type was necessary.127 
Most recently, in Quanta the first purchaser of the patented chip, 
Intel, had signed an agreement with the patentee promising to give 
notice to its own downstream purchasers about the restriction on use of 
the patented product in conjunction with non-Intel parts.128 The Court 
also observed that Quanta, the downstream purchaser against whom the 
post-sale restraint would have been imposed, purchased with actual 
notice of the restriction.129 The Court applied the first sale doctrine and 
refused to enforce the restraint notwithstanding the notice.130 
To the extent that post-sale restraints have any social value, the first 
sale rule seems to be an excessive way of addressing any problem of 
lack of notice and the patent holdup that results. A much better solution 
would be to give the patentee the incentive to ensure that any person 
upon whom a post-sale restraint will be imposed has notice of the 
restraint prior to making a commitment from which extraction would be 
costly. The Federal Circuit recently adopted such an approach in a 
different setting, holding that one who lied about patents during a 
standard setting process in which its patented technology was adopted 
would later be equitably stopped from asserting those patents against the 
covered standard.131 In the first sale context, the patentee would not be 
able to maintain its infringement suit against a subsequent purchaser or 
another who did not have objectively reasonable notice. If the original 
purchaser breached an agreement to provide notice to downstream 
 
100 (C.C. Mass. 1871) (No. 50); see also supra notes 37– 39 and accompanying text. 
125. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 342 (1908); see also supra notes 
40–42 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court’s brief opinion in Cortelyou v. 
Charles Eneu Johnson & Co., 207 U.S. 196 (1907), dismissed an infringement suit 
whose facts were similar to Henry, because the defendant lacked notice of the restriction. 
The action was one of contributory infringement, however, which has its own 
independent notice requirement. See id. at 199. 
126. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706–08 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
127. Id. at 706. 
128. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 623–24 (2008). 
129. Id. at 624. 
130. Id. at 637–38. 
131. Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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purchasers, then the appropriate remedy would be a breach of contract 
action against the first purchaser. 
The real property law of servitudes has coped quite well with a land 
use system that recognizes the value of both contract and remote (i.e., 
nonprivity) claims as enforcement vehicles. For example, suppose I sell 
you a parcel of land adjacent to my house, and impose on it a post-sale 
restraint that the land never be used for commercial purposes. This 
restriction can be enforced either as a “real covenant” or an “equitable 
servitude.” The classic law of real covenants is contractual in nature and 
depends on privity—either privity of contract if the agreement is being 
enforced between the original parties, or “privity of estate,” which acts 
as a substitute when one of the parcels of land has been transferred. For 
example, if you resold the parcel to X, who then began building a 
gasoline station on the property, I could enforce the covenant against X 
by showing that the restriction is contractual and that the transfer of the 
land from you to X created privity of estate between X and me, which 
would then substitute for privity of contract.132 
However, privity would not be necessary if I had placed the no-
commercial-use covenant in the deed and the deed had been properly 
recorded. In that case the restriction could be enforced as an equitable 
servitude against anyone with actual or constructive notice of the 
restraint, and privity would not matter.133 Most courts hold that the 
servitude must be properly recorded in the chain of title of all persons 
against whom subsequent enforcement is sought.134 The reasoning is 
fairly simple: it is much cheaper to record an interest in a known chain 
of title than it is to search many unknown ones. The same reasoning can 
be applied in the IP context. For example, the purchaser of a coffin 
would have to track down every patent covering it, determine whether 
the patent was still enforceable, and then query whether in some prior 
transfer to a component manufacturer the patentee had imposed a post-
sale restraint. 
If post-sale restraints serve potentially valuable functions and the 
 
132. See, e.g., SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, AMERICAN PROPERTY 
LAW 623–755 (5th ed. 2007). 
133. Trustees of Columbia Coll. v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 (1877) (enforcing recorded 
agreement between predecessors in title to build only single family homes on their 
respective lots, notwithstanding lack of privity); see also KURTZ & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 132, at 623–755. 
134. See, e.g., Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. Conn. Packing Co., 732 F.2d 286, 290 
(2d Cir. 1984); Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338, 340–41 (N.Y. 1991); Basore v. 
Johnson, 689 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). For the analogy to patents, see 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Notice and Patent Remedies, 88 TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1596789. 
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only objection to post-sale restraints is that they can take subsequent 
users or purchasers by surprise, a notice requirement seems much more 
suitable to the problem than the more draconian route of forbidding such 
restraints altogether. 
3. Intermediate Technology Transfers and Method Patents 
Even under the expansive definition of the first sale doctrine 
revitalized in Quanta, not every post-transfer restraint on IP is 
unenforceable. The doctrine may not apply to “intermediate” transfers of 
IP rights, in particular when the transfer does not include any patented 
article at all, but only a license to manufacture. 
Under the logic of the Supreme Court’s first sale decisions, when 
the patentee sells a patented article it gives up its power as to that 
particular unit and only that unit. The patentee still controls the patent 
and other copies of the article that it may choose to make. By contrast, 
when the patentee licenses production rights to someone else there is no 
inherent limit on the number of patented articles that the licensee can 
make or what their disposition will be. That means that post-transfer 
conditions are essential and generally enforceable, including by means 
of infringement actions, unless they are anticompetitive or in violation of 
patent policy. However, the transfer of a single unit of a good subject to 
a further process covered by a method patent is still no more than a 
transfer of a single unit, and the scope of the restraint is limited 
accordingly.135 
Under these principles: 
1. Under the first sale doctrine, when a finished patented article is sold 
to the first purchaser the patentee’s interests in that copy of the article 
are at an end; any limitations on further disposition of the article are 
governed by contract law and state public policy concerning restraints 
on alienation. 
2. When the patentee sells an unfinished article that requires 
application of the patentee’s method patents in order to make that 
particular copy of the article useable or marketable the first sale 
 
135.  United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250-251 (1942) (sale 
of an uncompleted article together with implied license to method patent to finish 
it exhausted the patentee’s right ”so far as it is or may be embodied in that 
particular article”).   Contrast this with the Federal Circuit’s rather categorical holding that 
method patents are not subject to exhaustion. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 
F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (relying on Glass Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 
F.3d 1337, 1341 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999)), rev’d sub nom. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., 
Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924 
(Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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doctrine also applies. Further, both the technology embodied in the 
article and the process patents needed to finish it are exhausted as to 
that copy. That is the only way to make sense of the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion in Quanta that the first sale decision applies to method 
patents.136 One way to view this problem is to say that the sale of the 
unfinished good requiring further application of the defendant’s 
patented method carries with it an implied license to the purchaser to 
finish that particular copy of the good, and exhaustion applies to both 
the article and the attached method license.137 
3. When the subject of the license is not a finished or semi-finished 
article but rather a general license to use the patentee’s method, 
process, or technology to produce articles “in gross,” the first sale 
doctrine does not ordinarily apply to the licensing of the process itself. 
However, if the patentee places restraints on the disposition of articles 
made by the licensee under the patent, the sale of those goods exhausts 
the patent with respect to them; that is, authorized sales of the article 
by the licensee are also subject to exhaustion with respect to the article 
sold. 
These rules rest on principles that date back to Blackstone’s 
distinction between land interests “appurtenant” and “in gross,” 
particularly in relation to commons property. As Blackstone observed, if 
farmers share grazing rights on commons that is appurtenant to their 
own farms, then their use is naturally limited: they cannot graze more 
cattle on the commons than their own farms support. However, if they 
own commons “in gross,” or personally, then there is no natural limit on 
their use of the common right, and artificial limits have to be imposed.138 
Blackstone’s distinction is applied today in the law of real property 
easements and covenants. An easement appurtenant is attached to and 
benefits a particular piece of land and cannot be used except to benefit 
 
136. See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 628–29 (2008). 
137. Cf. Julia E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the 
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 30–35 (2001) (discussing implied licenses and 
exhaustion in the context of reverse engineering). 
138. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *237–38: 
Another disturbance of common is by surcharging it; or putting more cattle 
therein than the pasture and herbage will sustain, or the party hath a right to do. 
In this case he that surcharges does an injury to the rest of the owners, by 
depriving them of their respective portions, or at least contracting them into a 
smaller compass. This injury by surcharging can properly speaking only 
happen, where the common is appendant or appurtenant, and of course 
limitable by law; or where, when in gross, it is expressly limited and certain: 
for where a man hath common in gross . . . he cannot be a surcharger. 
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that land.139 By contrast, an easement in gross is personal to the grantor, 
creating the possibility of excessive use. The common law responded by 
making easements in gross indivisible,140 while an easement appurtenant 
could be divided when the dominant estate to which it was attached was 
divided.141 
The sale of an unfinished article along with the implied license to 
finish it is akin to an easement appurtenant, which creates a license to 
improve or finish, but only with respect to the article being transferred. 
By contrast, the mere license of the right to make a good is incorporeal 
and could be used without limit unless limits are expressly attached to it. 
The first sale rule properly applies to the sale of the unfinished good 
with the single use license because the only thing that is taken from the 
patentee is the patent protection with respect to that unit. Exhaustion 
does not properly apply to the incorporeal interest, however, because 
once the interest is created there is nothing inherent in it that prevents 
the licensee’s rights from swallowing up the whole. In Adams v. Burke, 
for example, the patentee could license another to manufacture coffin 
lids and place any territorial limits he pleased. That is the way a patentee 
could organize production in conjunction with its licensee.142 But he 
could not sell a finished lid subject to a territorial limitation on where it 
could be used, and if the lid were unfinished and required a patent 
license in order to finish it, he could not place a territorial limitation on 
the process insofar as it covered that particular lid. 
The first sale rule thus served to distinguish situations in which the 
patentee was able to appropriate the value of the invention from those in 
which it was not.143 A pure manufacturing license without a post-
contract restriction would place no limit on the licensee’s ability to 
produce as much as it wished and sell wherever and to whomever it 
 
139. See, e.g., Penn Bowling Recreation Center v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 179 F.2d 64, 66 
(D.C. Cir. 1949) (applying common law rule forbidding owner of an easement in gross from 
using it to benefit lands other than the dominant estate). 
140. See, e.g., Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass’n, 200 A. 646, 651 (Pa. 
1938). The classic discussion is Lord Mountjoy’s Case, [1583] 78 Eng. Rep. 11 (K.B.), 
which held that an interest in gross could not be divided unless the multiple parties operated 
it as “one stock,” that is, a single enterprise such as a joint venture or partnership. For a 
detailed application of the decision in the United States, see Chandler v. Hart, 119 P. 516, 
520–22 (Cal. 1911); see also Lewis Mallalieu Simes, The Assignability of Easements in 
Gross in American Law, 22 MICH. L. REV. 521, 528 (1924). 
141. See, e.g., Martin v. Music, 254 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Ky. 1953). 
142. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873). 
143. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 125–27, 297–306 (2003); Yonatan Even, 
Appropriability, First Sale & Exhaustion (Sept. 28, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1274822. 
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pleased. By contrast, when a single copy of the patented good is sold, the 
patentee is able to appropriate the full value of that copy in the purchase 
price. Purchase of a single unit does not permit the buyer to make other 
copies or license others to make copies; it does not even permit buyers to 
“reconstruct” the patented good when it wears out.144 
Of course, this is an argument for permitting post-sale restraints on 
manufacturing licenses; it is not necessarily an argument for prohibiting 
post-sale restraints on the sale of individual copies of goods that are 
protected by IP rights. The rationale for the prohibition requires some 
reason why they are socially harmful. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions involving transfers of intermediate 
patent rights—that is, something falling short of the finished good—are 
consistent with these Blackstonian principles. First, the Court’s 1926 
decision in United States v. General Electric Co. held that a patentee’s 
pure manufacturing license did not exhaust any rights in the patent.145 
GE sold Westinghouse a license to manufacture light bulbs covered by 
its patent; GE did not sell Westinghouse the light bulbs themselves. The 
Court held that GE could stipulate the price at which Westinghouse sold 
those bulbs to consumers. Thus even a RPM agreement—per se 
unlawful at the time as a matter of antitrust law146—would be upheld if it 
was found to be within the patent grant. 
Both Univis Lens and General Talking Pictures involved more 
complex arrangements, including transfers of an intermediate article and 
a license to apply a patented process.147 The Supreme Court applied the 
first sale doctrine in the first case but not the second.148 
In Univis, the Supreme Court’s most recent application of the first 
sale rule prior to Quanta, the defendant patentee sold lens blanks for use 
in bifocal eyeglasses. The lens blanks were not useable in glasses as 
sold, but had to be ground to meet the wearer’s prescription needs before 
 
144. In general, the purchaser of a patented good may repair it but not 
“reconstruct” it. Making the distinction has proven extraordinarily difficult. See, e.g., 
Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102–05 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(discussing the differences with respect to patented disposable cameras intended for a 
single use but technologically capable of being refurbished). 
145. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926) (first sale doctrine did 
not apply to restriction placed on manufacturing licensee as opposed to one who purchased 
the patented product). 
146. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911), 
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
147. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Gen. Talking Pictures 
Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
148. See Univis, 316 U.S. at 250; Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 305 U.S. at 127. 
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they could be mounted into frames.149 Univis’ patents extended not only 
to the lenses but also to the grinding technology used by purchasers of 
the raw lenses.150 Univis sold the lens blanks subject to a RPM 
restriction that the Court ultimately found unlawful, but only after an 
intermediate finding that the restriction violated the first sale rule.151 
The Supreme Court conceded that the patented article was not 
“finished” and was necessarily subject to future refinements that were 
also covered by Univis’ patents. Nevertheless, “the only use to which it 
could be put and the only object of the sale is to enable the latter to grind 
and polish it for use as a lens by the prospective wearer.”152 That is, 
implicit in the sale of the lens blank was a right given to the purchaser to 
employ Univis’ grinding technology in order to turn that particular blank 
into a marketable set of eyeglasses. The right to finish was 
“appurtenant,” in Blackstone’s terminology, to the particular copy of the 
patented article that the purchaser bought.153 The process license and the 
blanks were tied together in a one-to-one ratio. Key to the Court’s 
decision was that the lens blank was useless unless subjected to the 
defendant’s patented method for grinding it into a finished lens. In that 
case, it saw the purchase of the unfinished lens as “inherently” including 
the right to complete the process needed in order to bring the lens to 
market.154 
 
149. Univis, 316 U.S. at 244–45. 
150. Id. at 249. 
151. Id. at 250–52. 
152. Id. at 249. 
153. See id. at 251: 
Our decisions have uniformly recognized that the purpose of the patent law is 
fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the patentee has received 
his reward for the use of his invention by the sale of the article, and that once 
that purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining the use 
and enjoyment of the thing sold . . . . Whether the licensee sells the patented 
article in its completed form or sells it before completion for the purpose of 
enabling the buyer to finish and sell it, he has equally parted with the article, 
and made it the vehicle for transferring to the buyer ownership of the invention 
with respect to that article. To that extent he has parted with his patent 
monopoly in either case, and has received in the purchase price every benefit 
of that monopoly which the patent law secures to him. 
154. See id. at 249: 
. . . it is plain that where the sale of the blank is by the patentee or his 
licensee—here the Lens Company—to a finisher, the only use to which it 
could be put and the only object of the sale is to enable the latter to grind and 
polish it for use as a lens by the prospective wearer. An incident to the 
purchase of any article, whether patented or unpatented, is the right to use and 
sell it, and upon familiar principles the authorized sale of an article which is 
capable of use only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent 
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The analogy has been applied to software patents. While making a 
copy of a patented article is typically infringement, one cannot use 
computer software without making a temporary copy of part of the 
software code. This code resides in the computer while the software is 
being used. Prohibiting such “copying” would effectively make the 
software useless.155 But consistent with Univis, software that was sold 
subject to this implied license could itself be subject to the first sale 
doctrine, prohibiting the patentee from imposing post-sale restraints via 
the threat of infringement actions.156 
In contrast, the Supreme Court presented General Talking Pictures 
as concerned not with the sale of a patented device, but rather with a 
license to manufacture a finished combination, in this case a sound 
system subject to a post-sale field-of-use restriction for noncommercial 
use.157 The Court upheld the restriction with scant reference to the first 
sale doctrine.158 The Court distinguished earlier first sale cases in two 
ways: (1) as in General Electric,159 the patentee did not sell a patented 
product to the first buyer but rather licensed that buyer to manufacture 
the patented product, subject to the field-of-use restriction; (2) the 
licensee then sold the finished product without restriction in violation of 
the license agreement. As a result of (2), the first sale of a completed 
good in the transaction was not “authorized” by the patentee, and thus 
the first sale rule did not attach.160 
 
monopoly with respect to the article sold. 
See also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 186 (1980) (implicitly 
accepting that sale of unpatented chemical with no use other than that in conjunction with 
the seller’s patented method exhausted method patent with respect to that combination); 
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 452 (1940) (finding that first sale rule 
covered gasoline additive and method patent for burning it). 
155. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 140, at 32. For a discussion of the problems 
involved in treating the automatic copy-making as direct patent infringement, see Keith E. 
Witek, Software Patent Infringement on the Internet and on Modern Computer Systems—
Who Is Liable for Damages?, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 303, 369–71 
(1998). 
156. Of course, breach of contract suits for violations of a valid license agreement 
might still be possible. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). The 
ProCD decision has not been without its critics, however. See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 1, 
at 632 (criticizing ProCD for sweeping too broadly); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: 
The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 147–50 (1999) 
(criticizing ProCD decision for failure to confront preemption issue). 
157. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
158. See id. at 125–27. 
159. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). 
160. In a strong dissent Justice Black, joined by Justice Reed, argued that the first sale 
doctrine should have applied. See Gen. Talking Pictures, 305 U.S. at 128 (Black, J., 
dissenting). Indeed, according to the district court’s opinion the licensee purchased vacuum 
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Another distinction between Univis and General Talking Pictures is 
more relevant to competition policy. Univis involved a restriction on the 
resale price that resellers of the patented lenses were required to charge. 
At the time resale price maintenance was unlawful per se under the 
Sherman Act.161 Read together, Univis and the Supreme Court’s 1926 
General Electric case stand for two propositions. First Univis declares 
that one may not sell a good, even if unfinished, and impose RPM on 
resellers, if the unfinished good has no use unless the patented process is 
applied to it; in that case the license is appurtenant to the good. By 
contrast, a pure manufacturing license that is not appurtenant to the sale 
of a good fails to exhaust the patent and thus the licensor is free to 
impose additional limits enforceable by infringement actions. However 
one characterizes the transaction in General Talking Pictures, the field-
of-use restraint at issue was a vertical nonprice restraint, and the 
Supreme Court had not yet determined the appropriate antitrust response 
to these.162 
The Federal Circuit largely disregarded these distinctions when it 
concluded quite categorically that when a patented good is subject to 
further application of a patented method the transaction is not subject to 
the first sale doctrine, for sale of the device does not exhaust the 
patentee’s interest in it.163 In its Quanta decision, the Supreme Court 
categorically held that the first sale doctrine applies to method patents 
attached to an article or device with almost no discussion of the policy 
 
tubes manufactured by the patentee and the boxes containing the tubes bore the challenged 
field-of-use restriction. See W. Elec. Co. v. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 16 F. Supp. 293, 
295 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). It then manufactured the amplifiers employing these tubes, under 
license from the patentee. It appears that the tubes could be used in any amplifier 
manufactured by the patentee as well as the amplifiers of others. The Government 
emphasized this point in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Quanta. See Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG 
Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL 3353102. 
161. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911), 
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
162. Antitrust challenges to vertical nonprice restraints emerged in the early 1960’s, 
after which the Court changed its mind twice. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 
U.S. 253, 261 (1963) (declining to condemn vertical nonprice restraints); United States v. 
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (condemning vertical nonprice restraints under 
per se rule), overruled by Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–59 (1977) 
(overruling Schwinn and applying rule of reason to vertical nonprice restraints instead of per 
se rule). 
163. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006), 
rev’d sub nom. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Glass Equip. 
Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1341 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Bandag, Inc. v. Al 
Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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implications.164 Neither line of decisions does much to illuminate the 
important issues. 
4. Mallinckrodt and the Durability Problem 
The Federal Circuit’s now overruled Mallinckrodt decision had 
departed from Supreme Court precedent by permitting a patentee to 
enforce a post-sale restraint on some patented articles by distinguishing 
unconditional from conditional sales.165 Further, the condition could be 
enforced by either a breach of contract action or a patent infringement 
action.166 
The restriction in question prohibited the purchaser of a medical 
device from reusing it.167 Although such a restriction could have 
different explanations, it was very possibly the patentee’s attempt to 
address a durable goods problem.168 The monopolist or oligopolist tries 
to avoid durability because it fears that its own product will come back 
to compete with itself. As a result it may resort to such tactics as leasing 
rather than selling its output.169 For example, in United Shoe 
Machinery,170 Xerox,171 and IBM,172 when they controlled the markets in 
 
164. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 628–30. 
165. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992), 
abrogated by Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
166. See id. at 701. 
167. The decision seems directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision a century 
earlier in American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882), where the Court 
applied the first sale doctrine to invalidate a patentee’s restriction on reuse of a belt 
buckle subject to a single use limitation. 
168. For one early observation of the problem, see Edward H. Chamberlin, The 
Product as an Economic Variable, 67 Q.J. ECON. 1, 23–24 (1953), observing that, 
[B]ecause durability can be varied, a producer has to face the question of how 
durable to make his product. Evidently if he makes it too durable, as soon as 
people have bought one unit they will not need another for a substantial period 
during which there will be no “repeat demand” for his product. He has an 
interest then in making it less durable so that people will come back that much 
sooner . . . . 
For a comprehensive review and critique, see Barak Y. Orbach, The Durapolist Puzzle: 
Monopoly Power in Durable-Goods Markets, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (2004). 
169. See Ronald H. Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. & ECON. 143 (1972); see 
also Michael Waldman, Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 
131 (2003). 
170. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 297 (D.Mass. 
1953), aff’d mem., 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam). For a critique, see Scott E. Masten & 
Edward A. Snyder, United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: on the 
Merits, 36 J.L. & ECON. 33 (1993). 
171. See In re Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 364 (1975); Timothy F. Bresnahan, Post-
Entry Competition in the Plain Paper Copier Market, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 15, 16 (1985). 
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their respective durable products, they leased rather than sold them. In 
that case no competitive market arises for the used good. In a perfectly 
competitive market, competition would force the firms to sell if selling 
were cost effective and what customers wanted. 
In a well-functioning market the patentee monopolist should be 
able to capture the full value of all downstream uses and reuses of its 
good—that is, the purchaser who intends to use it multiple times would 
be willing to pay the present value of repeated future uses, less 
anticipated costs.173 Of course, these incentives may be altered in 
markets with agency problems such as third-party payment, which 
characterizes the medical industry generally. 
One possible justification for the single use only restriction rests on 
the observation that inherent in the patent grant is the right to limit 
output. A patentee has the right to produce any amount of the patented 
good it pleases, right down to zero.174 A single use restriction is in fact a 
type of output reduction. At its choosing, the patentee could make 1000 
copies of its good or 100. If it makes 100, it can impose a single use 
restriction, thus limiting the right of purchasers to turn that 100 into 200 
or more by using each copy two or more times. 
But single use restrictions can be more harmful than simple output 
restrictions because they consume actual resources. Suppose a patented 
good is capable of being used twice before it wears out and under 
competition 1000 copies of the good, or 2000 uses, would be sold. 
Suppose further, however, that the patentee maximizes its profits by 
cutting output back to 1000 uses and setting a higher royalty rate. It 
could attain this result either by (1) producing 500 copies of the good 
without a restriction, leading each customer to use a copy twice; or (2) 
producing 1000 copies of the good but imposing a single use restriction 
on each. While both alternatives yield 1000 uses, the second one 
consumes more resources. In that case the single use restriction is a 
socially harmful solution to the durability problem. It not only prevents 
the rise of a used goods market but limits the use of each good to a 
single cycle. 
Of course, to the extent such conduct is costly, it would also seem 
 
172. United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68, 245 
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); FRANKLIN M. FISHER, ET AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED AND MUTILATED: 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN U.S. V. IBM 191–95 (1983). 
173. See Wolfhard Ramm, On the Durability of Capital Goods Under Imperfect 
Market Conditions, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 787 (1974). 
174. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) 
(patentee has right to bring infringement action even though it is not practicing the patent 
in question). 
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to be self-deterring. Why would the manufacturer produce 1000 units of 
the good subject to single use restrictions when it could obtain the same 
price by producing 500 units and permitting customers to use them 
twice? Further, there might be perfectly good technological reasons for 
such a limitation. Perhaps the device would be hazardous or unreliable if 
reused and could not effectively be refurbished. The defendant in 
Mallinckrodt apparently thought otherwise, for it was in the business of 
refurbishing the medical device in question, and hospitals were willing 
to purchase the refurbished units. The patentee stated that there were 
reasons related to health and liability for prohibiting reuse, but the 
Federal Circuit found it unnecessary to inquire into the merits of these 
explanations.175 
By not asking whether the restraint on reuse was technologically 
justified, the Federal Circuit effectively concluded that the patent grant 
contained within it the power to force post-sale users to use the product 
inefficiently. This social cost would undoubtedly be largest if 
 
175. The device in question delivered therapeutic radioactive material into the lungs in 
the form of an aerosol mist, as part of a treatment for pulmonary disease. Use of the device 
contaminated it with the radioactive materials as well as other possibly harmful materials, 
and refurbishing included a radiation sterilization process. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, 
Inc., 976 F.2d 701, 701–02 (1992). The Federal Circuit went on to reverse the lower court’s 
summary judgment ruling that the patents were unenforceable based on the single use 
restriction. Id. at 709. 
 The Lexmark print cartridge litigation also addressed single use restrictions and 
refurbishment. The restrictions in that case were originally allowed. See Ariz. Cartridge 
Remanufacturers Ass’n, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(upholding patentee’s restriction on its printer cartridges, requiring the cartridges be returned 
after single use in exchange for price discount); accord Static Control Components, Inc. v. 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 830, 847–48 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (inferring non-exhaustion 
from fact that patentee received lower price for cartridges subject to single-use restriction 
than for other cartridges and therefore patentee did not receive full reward for lower price 
cartridge). However, in the wake of Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 
617 (2008), the court changed its mind and held that the first sale doctrine applied so as to 
invalidate the tie. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 
2d 575, 576–77 (E.D. Ky. 2009). 
 For other cases on patent exhaustion and reuse, see Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (design patent exhausted by unrestricted sale; not 
infringement for foreign firm to repair patentee’s “single use” camera for reuse); Kendall Co. 
v. Progressive Med. Tech., Inc., 85 F.3d 1570, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (refusing to infer 
prohibition on reuse from simple fact that one element of patented product was spent with 
each use; device itself capable of roughly three years use); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 
F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1342 (2007) (exhaustion did not apply to 
self-replicating seed where second generation seed was identical to first generation; because 
the second generation seed was never sold at all, patent was not exhausted; further use of the 
seed required a license from the patentee); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002). 
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Mallinckrodt were a monopolist in the device. But it could be substantial 
even if the device were sold by a non-monopolist in a product 
differentiated market. The most likely explanation for why hospitals 
might accept Mallinckrodt’s terms is that a third-party payment 
mechanism for health insurance covered the device, thus reducing the 
transparency of true costs. 
At the same time, the first sale rule, which operates as a per se 
restraint, seems excessive given the self-deterring nature of harmful 
reuse restrictions and the alternative explanations for at least some of 
them. Rule of reason analysis under the antitrust laws or perhaps patent 
misuse doctrine seems more appropriate to the task. Indeed, the first sale 
doctrine as Quanta revitalized it would not even approve a post-sale 
restraint on reuse in cases where reuse was dangerous. A patentee could 
certainly warn against reuse, but it could not restrain reuse by means of a 
patent infringement suit. To be sure, Quanta might permit the patentee 
to maintain a breach of contract suit to enforce the single use restriction, 
but enforcement would depend on the vagaries of the privity 
requirement. For example, if the hospital disposed of the device after a 
single use but the waste disposal firm sold them to a renewal firm, a 
contract claim could not run against the latter even though notice was 
clear. 
5. Price Discrimination 
Price discrimination occurs when a seller obtains different ratios of 
price to marginal cost from different buyers. Price discrimination is 
generally said to come in three kinds, or “degrees.” Virtually all 
instances of actual price discrimination are either third-degree or second-
degree discrimination. 
In third-degree price discrimination the seller is able ex ante to 
segregate customers into different groups based on the group’s 
willingness to pay and offer different prices to different groups. A 
common example in the IP context is offering different prices to 
commercial and personal users, as in both General Talking Pictures and 
ProCD.176 One characteristic of third-degree price discrimination is a 
discontinuity in buyer substitution that denies the good to some high-
value purchasers while giving the good to others for whom the good is 
less valuable. For example, if I charge commercial purchasers of my 
sound amplifiers $1000 and personal users $500, the commercial users 
will purchase down to the point that their marginal value reaches $1000 
 
176. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938); ProCD, 
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). 
NYU POST SALE RESTRAINTS 15 FEB 2011 2/15/2011  6:06 AM 
144 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW  
 
and no more. A commercial user who values the next amplifier at $950 
will not buy it even though other users, the personal ones, are actually 
buying at a price of $500. So a $950 purchaser is turned away while a 
$500 is served. This denial to high-value purchasers and sale to low-
value purchases means that third-degree price discrimination reduces 
welfare unless the seller brings in new purchasers under the price 
discrimination scheme. As a result, economists since at least Arthur 
Cecil Pigou have concluded that third-degree price discrimination 
reduces welfare unless it increases total market output.177 
By contrast, second-degree price discrimination occurs when the 
seller offers a price schedule with differing prices. Customers self-select 
the price by choosing where to place themselves on the schedule. 
Quantity discounts are an example, as are divisions between first and 
coach class airline tickets to the extent that price differences are not 
proportional to cost differences. Variable proportion tying arrangements, 
in which different customers use the tied product in differing amounts, 
are an instance of second-degree price discrimination because the tying 
product is offered at one price to everyone and so is the tied product. 
Customers “select” the rate of return the arrangement produces to the 
seller by choosing the number of tied units to purchase.178 For example, 
in a printer/ink cartridge tie the seller typically cuts the price of the 
printer from its standalone profit maximizing level, builds a monopoly 
overcharge into the ink cartridge, and then requires all users of the 
printer to purchase its cartridges.179 The result is that monopoly returns 
on the printer/cartridge package are higher for higher volume users. 
However, everyone purchases ink cartridges down to the point that 
marginal value equals the purchase price, with the purchase price being 
the same for all. So for example, if the printer manufacturer reduces the 
price of the printer and increases the price of tied ink cartridges from 
$15 to $20, every buyer will purchase down to the point that the 
marginal value of a cartridge to her equals $20. This distinctive feature 
of second-degree price discrimination has produced some confusion in 
the antitrust literature. It is not the case that variable proportion ties 
systematically transfer output from higher- to lower-value customers; 
 
177. See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, II.14.13 (4th ed. 
1932); Marius Schwartz, Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a 
Welfare Result, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1259 (1990). 
178. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 147 
(1988); Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
229, 236 (2005). 
179. See, e.g., Static Control Components, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 576–77 (applying first 
sale doctrine to invalidate printer/ink cartridge tie). 
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only third-degree price discrimination does that.180 To be sure, variable 
proportion ties typically result in a reduced price for the tying product 
and a higher price for the tied product, and this is a distortion from 
perfect competition. But it is not the same distortion that third-degree 
price discrimination produces.181 
The final type of price discrimination is first-degree, or “perfect” 
price discrimination, which occurs when a seller is able to sell each unit 
at the highest price that any buyer is willing to pay for it. Variable 
proportion ties almost never come close to being first-degree price 
discrimination. While a highly accurate variable proportion tie might be 
able to meter the relationship between consumer value and the number 
of units a customer uses, it cannot capture the residual value that 
different customers place on the good. To illustrate, both a printer of 
handbills for garage sales and a law firm printing offering statements for 
IPOs might require precisely 1000 pages of printing per week. After 
that, their willingness to pay falls sharply. If they purchase identical 
printers under identical ties they will end up paying the same amount. 
However, the garage sale printer might value the printouts at very close 
to the incremental price of, say, 3 cents per page, while the law firm 
values them at $12 per page. In that case there will be a great deal of 
unclaimed consumer surplus remaining from the law firm purchaser and 
the price discrimination scheme must be classified as second-degree. 
Most variable proportion ties involve a price reduction in the tying 
product, sometimes to the competitive level and sometimes even to zero, 
accompanied by an increase in the price of the tied product.182 
Depending on the magnitude of (1) the price cut in the tying product, (2) 
the price increase in the tied product, and (3) the output effects, a 
variable proportion tie can either increase or decrease both general and 
consumer welfare.183 Further, since there are three variables, not just 
one, it is impossible to make categorical judgments about the 
 
180. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 431 n.89 (2009) (suggesting that 
variable proportion ties reallocate output from high-value to low-value users). 
181. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 9 (manuscript at 10). 
182. Virtually every decision that has discussed the issue has indicated that the 
defendant reduced rather than increased the price of the tying product when it engaged in 
tying. See id at *18–19. For an example of a zero price tying product, see Kentmaster Mfg. 
Co. v. Jarvis Prods. Corp., 146 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 1998), amended by 164 F.3d 1243 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (defendant provided durable meat cutting equipment at no charge to meat cutters 
but charged high prices for aftermarket parts); see also Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis., Inc., 660 
F.Supp.2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“As is true of other printer manufacturers, Xerox 
generally sells its printers at a low margin or a loss, hoping to earn a profit through later sales 
of high-margin ink.”). 
183. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 9 (manuscript at 19–28). 
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relationship between output and welfare. In any event, most price 
discrimination ties probably increase output, and many do so 
substantially.184 In such cases there is no warrant for believing they are 
harmful to either general welfare or consumer welfare. Further, their 
profitability does not depend on the exclusion of any rival, and price 
discrimination ties are common even in moderately competitive markets, 
such as fast-food franchising.185 As a result there is no warrant for 
condemning them as a matter of competition policy, and certainly not 
with a categorical per se rule. 
The 1912 Henry decision was the last occasion that the Supreme 
Court refused to apply the first sale rule to the sale of a patented good 
subject to a variable proportion tie.186 In that case the manufacturer sold 
mimeograph machines at below cost and recouped its profits on 
overcharges on the consumable supplies.187 Henry was overruled by 
Motion Picture Patents, which involved yet another variable proportion 
tying arrangement that facilitated price discrimination.188 Since Motion 
Picture Patents was decided, patentees have largely relied on contract 
restrictions to impose ties rather than post-sale restraints—a result that 
the Supreme Court itself suggested in that case.189 Otherwise they have 
avoided the first sale rule by leasing the patented durable goods rather 
than selling it.190 
 
184. See id. at 6. 
185. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971). 
186. Henry v. A.B. Dick & Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled by Motion Picture 
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); see also supra notes 54–57 
and accompanying text. 
187. The lower court’s decision discusses the facts of the case. See A.B. Dick Co. 
v. Henry, 149 F. 424, 425 (C.C.N.Y. 1907) (“The evidence establishes that the 
complainants sell the machines at a loss, less than the actual cost of making, relying on 
sales of supplies therefor for a profit.”); see also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal 
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917) (noting patentee’s argument that the public 
benefitted “by the sale of the machine at what is practically its cost”). 
188. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 516; see also supra notes 55–56 and 
accompanying text. 
189. See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 509 (“The extent to which the use of the 
patented machine may validly be restricted to specific supplies or otherwise by special 
contract between the owner of a patent and the purchaser . . . [is] a question outside the 
patent law . . . .”). For an example, see Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 
U.S. 28 (2006) (refusing to condemn a tie of a patented printer to unpatented ink after 
overturning presumption that patented tying product confers market power). While the 
patentee in Illinois Tool Works initially took the position that the ink was covered by its 
patent it later amended that position and what had started out as an infringement action 
became an antitrust challenge to the license agreement. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool 
Works, 396 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
190. See, e.g., Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (leased machines 
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The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988 provides that patent ties of 
this sort are not misuse unless the patentee has market power in the 
patented tying product.191 Interestingly, that provision appears to permit 
patent ties accompanying the sale of a patented product, in violation of 
the first sale doctrine. The provision states that a patentee will not be 
guilty of “illegal extension of the patent right” if it “conditioned . . . the 
sale of the patented product on the . . . purchase of a separate product” 
unless the patentee has market power.192 Since Quanta involved 
exclusive dealing and not tying, this provision was not implicated. 
However, in Motion Picture Patents the sale of the patented projector 
was conditioned on the purchase of a separate product.193 As the Motion 
Picture Patents decision described the first sale doctrine, it clearly 
involved an improper extension of the patent right.194 Indeed, while the 
“illegal extension of the patent” concern has been widely stated in 
misuse law,195 it actually originated in first sale law.196 So it is difficult 
to escape the conclusion that the Patent Misuse Reform Act operates to 
create a statutory exception to the first sale doctrine for tying 
arrangements. Nevertheless, no decision of which I am aware has 
interpreted the statute in that way. In any event, the antitrust law 
governing ties has evolved significantly and today regards them as 
relatively benign.197 By contrast, the first sale doctrine recognizes no 
exception for competitively harmless restraints. 
 
with provision requiring lessee to use patentee’s salt); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 
314 U.S. 488, 489 (1942) (finding patent misuse when patent holder leased salt injecting 
machine with lease provision requiring lessee to use the patentee’s salt tablets); Int’l Bus. 
Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (lease requiring lessees of tabulating 
machines to use lessor’s punch cards). 
191. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000), providing that a patentee shall not be deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent if it has: 
[C]onditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented 
product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of 
a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has 
market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on 
which the license or sale is conditioned. 
192. Id. 
193. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 506 (1917); see supra notes 90–97 and 
accompanying text. 
194. Id. at 516 (“[T]he exclusive right granted in every patent must be limited to 
the invention described in the claims of the patent, and that it is not competent for the 
owner of a patent, by notice attached to its machine, to, in effect, extend the scope of its 
patent monopoly by restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its operation, but 
which are no part of the patented invention . . . .”). 
195. See Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 10 n.43, 18–20). 
196. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
197. See generally AREEDA, ELHAUGE, & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ch. 17. 
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The statutory misuse provision and the permissive attitude of 
modern antitrust law should not be read as a broad congressional policy 
of permitting price discrimination by means of variable proportion tying 
arrangements. The Patent Misuse Reform Act exonerates patent ties 
from misuse claims only when the seller lacks market power in the 
patented product, and at least minimal market power is necessary for 
price discrimination.198 In Illinois Tool Works the Supreme Court 
equated this requirement for misuse with the antitrust laws as well.199 By 
contrast, assuming that the Patent Misuse Reform Act does not create an 
exception, the first sale doctrine applies what is effectively a per se rule 
to price discrimination ties on patented goods without any inquiry into 
market power or anticompetitive effects. 
While second-degree price discrimination is the typical result of 
variable proportion tying arrangements, third-degree price 
discrimination that can be facilitated by post-sale restraints typically 
arises from field-of-use restrictions. For example, a “noncommercial use 
only” restriction is likely to be a way that a patentee can charge a higher 
price for commercial than for noncommercial users of its product. While 
the patentee might make the initial sale of the noncommercial version to 
a noncommercial user, the restriction would be needed to restrain further 
transactions to commercial purchasers—that is, to prevent arbitrage.200 
By the same token, selectively used “single use” restrictions may 
discriminate between those licensed to make unlimited uses and those 
subject to the restrictions.201 A restriction that results in different prices 
for different categories of users, such as commercial and residential, 
does in fact transfer sales from high value to lower value purchasers, and 
thus reduces welfare unless output increases.202 
Given that most price discrimination ties are lawful today, the “first 
sale” question is whether they should be enforced by infringement suits 
rather than breach of contract suits. That question can be important in 
situations where contributory infringers are easy to detect but primary 
infringers are not. For example, Lexmark may wish to tie printers and 
 
198. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 120, ¶ 721. 
199. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (equating misuse 
and antitrust standards for tying arrangements). 
200. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing arbitrage issues with licenses that attempt to price discriminate). 
201. See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 
830, 836 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (printer manufacturer sold patented cartridges at a lower price 
subject to condition that they not be refilled); cf. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 
F.2d 700, 706–08 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (illustrating that single-use restrictions might not involve 
higher prices for the sale of the same article without the restriction). 
202. See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text. 
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ink cartridges. However, if it is unable to use a technological lock to 
exclude non-Lexmark cartridges, the tying restriction could be very 
difficult to enforce against Lexmark’s customers. It would be very costly 
to monitor customer aftermarket purchasing behavior. By contrast, 
widespread manufacturing of cartridges designed for Lexmark printers 
might be easy to detect. These “pirate” manufacturers would be guilty of 
contributory infringement if the tie was enforceable by an infringement 
action, but they are not in privity of contract with Lexmark and so a 
purely contractual tie will not bind them. If notice is essential, Lexmark 
could take care of that problem by informing these cartridge 
manufacturers of the restriction. 
Perhaps there is no good policy argument for giving the holder of 
an IP right a greater power to engage in price discrimination than the 
owner of any tangible asset.203 But state policy respecting post-sale 
restraints on personal property is mixed, with a trend toward enforcing 
them.204 In any event, there is no obvious reason why federal 
competition or patent policy should prevent post-sale restraints imposed 
on those with proper notice, simply because they might facilitate price 
discrimination but with no query into social or consumer harm. If price 
discrimination can be shown to injure competition or work as a 
disincentive to innovation it should be condemned as a matter of 
competition policy. The per se rule contained in the first sale doctrine 
thus seems seriously overdeterrent to the extent that it condemns the 
tying condition with no query whatsoever into competitive effects or 
propensity for harm. 
6. Restraints on Innovation 
A restraint on innovation can arise when the purchaser of a good is 
prevented from developing a competing good.205 For example, in 
 
203. See generally Mark R. Patterson, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Patent 
Infringement Through Field-of-Use Licensing, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 221–24 (2007) 
(discussing issues with price discrimination of patented products); see also Wendy J. 
Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1367, 1386–90 (1998) (questioning justifications for price discrimination); 
Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 
1874–78 (1984) (reviewing problems created by price discrimination). But see Makan 
Delrahim, The Long and Winding Road: Convergence in the Application of Antitrust to 
Intellectual Property, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 259, 264 (2005) (“[A]llowing the firm that 
developed the software to price discriminate may increase social welfare by promoting 
the efficient commercialization of the asset.”). 
204. See generally Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1449 (2004). 
205. See Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 35). 
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Lasercomb the Fourth Circuit found misuse in a software licensor’s 
condition prohibiting the licensee from developing any product that 
competed with the licensed software.206 While Lasercomb involved a 
license restriction on a copyright, the same principle could apply to the 
sale of a patented product subject to the condition that the purchaser 
does not develop a competing product.207 The cost of a lost opportunity 
to innovate can be substantial,208 and that harm could result whether or 
not the patentee had significant market power in its patented good.209 
Concern about post-sale restraints on purchasers’ innovations in 
competition with the patented device could be a perfectly good reason 
for denying enforcement of particular restrictions, such as exclusive use 
or noncompetition covenants. However, this concern hardly justifies a 
draconian rule that prohibits every post-sale restraint without any inquiry 
into the nature or likely effects of the challenged restriction. 
III. 
DOES THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE? 
Those decisions that have enforced a patentee’s “conditional” sales 
inconsistently with the Supreme Court’s exhaustion doctrine recognize 
violators as infringers or contributory infringers.210 By contrast, 
 
206. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990). 
207. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 563 F.3d 1301, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(finding possible misuse in package licensing arrangement that may have prevented 
licensee from developing a competing product), rev’d en banc, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 1948) (finding patent 
misuse when patentee licensed patent subject to condition that licensee not develop 
competing technology); Nat’l Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, 256 
(3d Cir. 1943) (finding misuse when patentee conditioned manufacturing license on 
licensee’s promise not to manufacture competing goods); Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 
F. Supp. 2d 931, 939–40 No. C 08-03251 WHA, 2009 WL 303046, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 
2009) (finding possible misuse when Apple prevented use of its computer operating 
system on a non-Apple computer, thus restraining development of rival’s machine 
designed to use Apple and Microsoft operating systems interchangeably). A later 
decision upset the misuse finding. See Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 931, 
939–40 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
208. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247 
(2007). 
209. See Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 17, 45–46). 
210. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick & Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled by Motion 
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917). In Mallinckrodt, 
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706–08 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the Federal Circuit essentially 
returned to the Henry rule. See Patterson, supra note 209, at 167–71; Edwin E. Richards, 
Drafting Licenses to Guide Whether Potential Disputes Lie in Contract or Infringement, 7 
COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 45 (2002) (implying continued use of patented product after 
breach of conditional license may support an infringement claim). 
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licensing agreements themselves are governed by contract law and 
generally enforced in state court. They do not implicate first sale 
doctrine, but they can be enforced only by breach of contract actions.211 
Federal Circuit jurisprudence has not always been clear on the condition 
versus contract distinction.212 That court has spoken of conditional sales 
that evade the exhaustion requirement as requiring “a restriction having 
contractual significance . . . .”213 However, when these “contracts” are to 
be enforced, the Federal Circuit has permitted enforcement via patent 
infringement actions rather than breach of contract actions.214 
Without stating any policy argument for its preservation, the 
Supreme Court nevertheless soundly reaffirmed the first sale doctrine in 
its 2008 Quanta decision.215 Further, it did so with the enthusiastic 
support of the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division. In its amicus brief the government had argued very 
forcefully that “[r]estrictions on downstream use or resale may arise as a 
matter of state contract law, but not patent law.”216 Ironically, this was 
the same Antitrust Division that had argued a year earlier that the per se 
rule against RPM should be overruled,217 and that has very severely cut 
 
211. The Court observed this distinction already in the late nineteenth century. See 
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 665 (1895): 
Whether a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special contracts 
brought home to the purchasers is not a question before us, and upon which we 
express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a question would arise as 
a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and effect of 
the patent laws. 
212. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 140, at 34–35, 56 (criticizing the Federal 
Circuit’s ambiguous and incorrect use of contract doctrine). 
213. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445, 1453 
(Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1108 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (conditional sale requires an “express contractual undertaking by the 
purchaser”). 
214. See, e.g., LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2006), rev’d sub. nom Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); 
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Interestingly, both LG 
and Mallinckrodt relied on U.C.C. provisions stating the existence of a contract in order to 
find that the condition existed. See LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370; Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 
708 n.7. 
215. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
216. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *175, 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL 
3353102. Or, as the government articulated the first sale doctrine in opening its argument: 
“The doctrine bars the use of patent law (but not contract law) to enforce restrictions on a 
purchaser’s use or resale of a patented article that was purchased from the patentee or from 
someone authorized by the patentee to sell the article.” Id. at 7. 
217. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480), 
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back enforcement of the law against vertical restraints. So why such a 
hard line against post-sale conditions that can be enforced by IP 
infringement suits, with so much tolerance of contractual arrangements 
that can accomplish the same thing? 
The answer must be that the government is not particularly 
concerned about the substance of the restraint at issue—whether it be 
tying or RPM or some form of exclusivity—but with its form. That is, 
there must be something inherently wrong about using licensing 
conditions plus the threat of infringement suits, as opposed to simple 
breach of contract actions. Further, notice must be inadequate to address 
the issue. 
The worst problem of the first sale rule is that it lacks subtlety. To 
be sure, there is a set of technical rules that determines when a 
qualifying “sale” of a patented or copyrighted good has occurred. 
However, once such a sale is found enforcement of the post-sale restraint 
is denied automatically, with no consideration of the restraint’s purpose 
or effect. This means that market power, competitive effects and 
implications for innovation are all irrelevant. That naturally invites the 
question whether the first sale doctrine serves any useful purpose at all. 
Is there a set of cases where simple contract enforcement is inadequate 
and where the antitrust and misuse rules will fail to police every 
behavior that we want to see controlled? 
Post-sale conditions enforced by infringement actions seem 
superior to contract suits when the restraint is socially beneficial and a 
large and diverse number of downstream people are affected. Consider 
the servitudes problem in real property again.218 If Alpha does not want 
commercial uses on Blackacre, she can impose a servitude on the land, 
have it properly recorded, and that is the end of the matter. Everyone 
who wants to buy or build on Blackacre has constructive notice of the 
restriction. Alternatively, Alpha could contract with the initial purchaser 
of Blackacre and agree that this purchaser upon pain of damages will 
impose the restriction on all parties downstream, and potentially we 
could have an endless series of such contracts. But this solution is much 
messier and increases transaction costs very significantly by requiring 
ongoing contracting and re-contracting. In sum, the “infringement” 
action permits enforcement of the restriction at much lower transaction 
costs than the endless series of breach of contract actions. 
Clearly, however, notice is key. The law of servitudes on real 
property generally provides that if the servitude is not properly recorded, 
then the servitude cannot be enforced against a subsequent bona fide 
 
2007 WL 173650. 
218. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text. 
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purchaser without actual notice. That requirement makes the market for 
servitudes function very well and has largely eliminated holdup 
problems—for example, the intending developer who buys land for a 
subdivision and finds out only after development has begun that there is 
a non-development servitude in place. Unfortunately, IP rights and IP 
licenses have nothing approaching the rather effective recordation and 
notice provisions that apply to land titles. So if such limitations are to be 
enforced this places on the enforcer the obligation to see to it that notice 
is effective under the circumstances.219 
As a general matter one can be guilty of patent infringement 
without having any notice whatsoever.220 If that rule were applied to 
post-sale restraints, the result could be a significant problem of hold-up, 
as innocent subsequent purchasers could be sued for patent infringement 
for violating conditions they knew nothing about. But as noted 
previously, those courts that have enforced post-sale restraints have 
either required that timely notice of the restriction be given to the 
offender or else they have observed that notice was in fact given.221 If 
notice had been the government’s only concern in Quanta, it could have 
urged the court to uphold the Federal Circuit’s departure from the 
historical first sale rule, but conditioned it on adequate downstream 
notice to affected parties. 
To be sure, a notice is not the same thing as a contract. First of all, 
notices are typically unilateral acts and can be incomplete as to content, 
target, and communication.222 One who sees “This copy machine may be 
maintained only by Alpha Corp.” printed on a machine does not know if 
she is looking at a restraint on an unpatented good, which may or may 
not be enforceable under state law; whether the patent has expired; or, 
depending on the language, the precise meaning of the terms. Further, 
the notice may not be apparent to every person who might later be in a 
position to do maintenance on the machine; it could be removed, or it 
might not be contained on a particular component that is sent in for 
servicing. Under Henry a complete stranger to any transaction having to 
do with the machine, but who knew of the notice, would be guilty of 
patent infringement if he replaced a gasket or perhaps even if he dusted 
off the glass cover. 
The notice problem also gets much trickier when a good changes 
hands many times, particularly if it is incorporated by the production 
process into other goods, as in Quanta. Just as real property covenants 
 
219. See Hovenkamp, supra note 141. 
220. See supra notes 121–31 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
222. See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02 (2010). 
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“run with the land,” patent conditions, if enforceable, travel with the 
good from one owner to another. In real property law we deal with this 
problem with a largely effective set of recording provisions. But 
patented goods have no equivalent system and so it is much more likely 
that the good will pass to someone who does not have adequate notice.223 
Once again, however, the solution seems to be to make patent 
infringement in such cases depend on reasonably communicated notice 
and to place the burden of providing effective and timely notice on the 
licensing patentee. 
Also important is the fact that unlike breach of contract actions, 
patent infringement actions have historically incorporated a preference 
for injunctive relief. The right to bring an infringement action for an 
injunction could yield a holdup problem in situations where the 
subsequent purchaser lacked adequate notice of the restrictions, but that 
problem is addressed by an effective notice requirement. In any event, 
under the Supreme Court’s eBay decision, injunctions are to be issued 
for patent infringement only when the plaintiff meets the same criteria as 
apply to equitable actions generally.224 It is not obvious today that the 
right to an injunction to enforce a post-sale restraint via patent law 
would be any broader than the right to enforce it by a contract suit. 
Contract remedies would probably be expectation damages in most 
situations.225 Most actions would be filed in state court unless there is 
diversity jurisdiction in federal court. By contrast, a patent infringement 
suit could be filed in a single federal court against all infringers, 
including both the first purchaser made subject to the restriction and its 
customers, users, service personnel, and the like.226 Damages can be the 
reasonable royalty rate together with interest and costs227 or up to treble 
damages for willful infringers, which presumably includes downstream 
customers who took with actual notice of the restriction.228 Of course, 
 
223. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 120, at 46–72 (2008). 
224. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006); see also 
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 
(2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
631, 657 (2007) (finding that after eBay, permanent injunctions tend to be issued when 
patentee and infringer are direct competitors and tend not to be issued when patentee is a 
non-practicing entity). 
225. See U.C.C. § 2-714 (2005); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded 
Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COL. L. REV. 1428, 1446 
(2004). 
226. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006). 
227. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
228. Id. To prove willful infringement, the patentee must show the infringer was 
objectively reckless in determining whether they would infringe the patent. In re Seagate 
Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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successful antitrust challenges can do the same thing, and in that case 
treble damages would be mandatory.229 
Another possible difference between post-sale conditions and 
contract terms is jurisdictional. The Federal Circuit’s now defunct 
jurisprudence permitting post-sale restraints implied that the conditions 
could be enforced by patent infringement actions, and appeals from 
these actions go automatically and exclusively to the Federal Circuit.230 
By contrast, breach of contract actions ordinarily go into state court, 
reaching the federal courts only upon the happenstance of diversity of 
citizenship or a suitable federal question. Appeals would go to the 
appropriate regional Circuit. 
The government also argued in Quanta that restrictions that are 
found to be within the patent grant may be relatively free from antitrust 
scrutiny, while licensing agreements are not.231 But that argument seems 
quite hollow in a world where antitrust treatment of vertical restrictions 
is minimal and in any event patent “misuse” is governed by antitrust 
principles. There is little reason to think that an anticompetitive restraint 
imposed as a condition would be treated differently from the same 
restraint imposed by contract. Cases such as Univis make clear that in 
the process of applying the first sale doctrine the Court was also 
expressing a policy about RPM, which was unlawful per se at the time 
Univis was decided.232 
So traditional antitrust analysis could be used to address post-sale 
restraints no matter how they are treated. Indeed, to the extent that the 
law of patent and copyright “misuse” deviates from antitrust principles, 
it condemns more rather than less.233 Further, “misuse” law derives from 
the IP statutes themselves and clearly applies to notice restrictions that 
 
229. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (giving Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction 
over appeals from cases arising under Patent Act); see also Holmes Group, Inc. v. 
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002) (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdiction is fixed with reference to that of the district court, and turns on whether the 
action arises under federal patent law.”). 
231. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 29, 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL 
3353102 (“The Federal Circuit’s approach also has the potential to erode downstream 
competition by permitting patentees to avoid anti-trust scrutiny of restrictions on the use and 
resale of products embodying their inventions.”). Some examples include Bement v. Nat’l 
Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91–95 (1902) (upholding price restriction as within the scope of 
the patent) and United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1936) (upholding 
price restrictions “reasonably” within the scope of the patent grant). 
232. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); see supra notes 152–
56 and accompanying text. 
233. See Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 18). 
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are intended to be enforced by infringement actions.234 Today, resale 
price restrictions such as those in General Electric or Univis would 
rarely be unlawful, given that the per se rules against both minimum and 
maximum RPM have been overturned.235 Tying and exclusive dealing or 
related practices could still be actionable. While tying is arguably still 
covered by a per se rule,236 exclusive dealing is addressed under the rule 
of reason and, in any event, both require a traditional showing of market 
power—i.e., market power cannot be presumed from the existence of the 
patent itself.237 
The post-sale restriction that the Federal Circuit enforced in Quanta 
resembles tying or exclusive dealing, but it seems unlikely that this was 
its intended purpose.238 The restriction forbade downstream purchasers 
of parts manufactured by Intel under the patentee’s license from using 
them in combination with any non-Intel components. Ordinarily a 
restriction limiting the purchaser or licensee to using only the seller’s 
brand would be exclusive dealing, or tying if multiple products were 
involved.239 In this case, however, Intel made only a tiny minority of the 
numerous components that go into a computer. It would be a little like 
Firestone Tire Co. entering into a contract with General Motors agreeing 
to supply tires to GM but only on the condition that GM not use any 
non-Firestone products in its automobiles. It would simply be impossible 
for GM to comply with the condition. The purpose of the restriction 
must have been to turn the downstream computer assemblers into 
infringers, presumably so that the patentee could extract additional 
royalties from purchasers who had already made specific commitments 
to the patentee’s technology. That was the position that the government 
 
234. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942); 
Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. 
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). All three decisions involved notice 
restrictions and patent infringement suits for their violation. 
235. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) 
(overturning per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997) (overturning per se rule against maximum resale price maintenance); 
see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶¶ 1620 (minimum RPM), 1635 (maximum 
RPM). 
236. On this point, see 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶ 1720 (2d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2005). 
237. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (upsetting 
presumption of market power for patented tying products); see 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, JOHN 
L. SOLOW & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 518 (3d ed. 2007). 
238. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev’d 
sub nom. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
239. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1821. 
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took in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court.240 
IV. 
CONCLUSION: POST-SALE RESTRAINT DOCTRINE 
The problem of reaching downstream parties disturbed both sides 
of the Quanta dispute, but seems to favor the Federal Circuit’s approach. 
Those favoring the Federal Circuit’s approach speak of the great 
difficulty of identifying downstream purchasers and negotiating 
individual licenses with them. Those favoring the contract approach 
speak of the problem of taking downstream users by surprise by means 
of ineffectively communicated restrictions and a set of infringement 
rules that can be enforced without regard to privity of contract and the 
limitations inherent in contract damage rules. 
The Supreme Court and the government’s position in Quanta seems 
excessively draconian, yielding a per se rule against a practice that was 
not clearly shown to be more harmful than its alternatives, at least when 
infringement actions are conditioned on effective notice communicated 
in a timely manner. In a world in which both post-sale conditions and 
license restrictions are available one would expect the parties to 
negotiate the one that was most profitable to them. It is not obvious that 
one is more harmful than the other, at least in those circumstances when 
adequate notice is given to potential downstream infringers. 
In the sixty-year interval between Univis and Quanta, the Supreme 
Court’s most recent two first sale cases, the Court (1) adopted and later 
rejected a per se rule for vertical nonprice restraints;241 (2) abandoned 
the per se rule against maximum RPM in 1997242 and minimum RPM in 
2007;243 (3) greatly loosened the law against tying arrangements;244 and 
 
240. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27, 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL 
3353102: 
This case provides an illustration. Absent patent exhaustion, the lawful 
purchase of an article useful only for practicing the patent provides no value to 
the purchaser until completion of further negotiations and a further payment 
for the right to use or to resell. Moreover, the need for further negotiations and 
payments may depend on a court’s after-the-fact determination whether the 
seller adequately expressed a limitation on the rights conveyed. 
241. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (condemning 
vertical nonprice restraints under per se rule), overruled by Continental T.V. v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see also supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text. 
242. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997). 
243. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
244. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Jefferson 
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 
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(4) developed more lenient standards for exclusive dealing. The Illinois 
Tool Works decision upsetting the market power presumption for 
patented tying products is particularly instructive, because the court 
made it clear that both antitrust and misuse doctrine had evolved toward 
considerably greater toleration of post-sale tying restrictions on patented 
goods.245 
The reversion in Quanta requires an explanation. A coherent legal 
doctrine of post-sale IP restraints must first identify the set of goals it is 
designed to serve. In this case there are two: restraints on competition 
and restraints on innovation, together with a more residual concern to 
protect access to the public domain. As a policy matter, whether the 
restraint is carried out by a condition and enforced by an infringement 
action, or by a contract term enforceable through state law, is a detail 
that depends greatly on the communication of effective notice, but 
otherwise has little effect on either competition or innovation policy. If 
the Supreme Court had viewed the problem this way it could have 
produced a more unified and useful set of legal rules governing post-sale 
restraints that threaten either competition or innovation. 
 
 
Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). 
245. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 33–37. 
